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I. INTRODUCTION
Motive and intent play a prominent role in the Supreme Court's
most recent definitions of responsibility. In a variety of doctrinal
areas, the Court requires plaintiffs to prove the defendant's motive or
intent, imputing responsibility only when the defendant's will and
conscious choice played a part in the harm.' Victims of police brutal-
ity must show that their aggressors acted with "deliberate indiffer-
ence".'2 Market participants injured by the manipulations of insider
traders must show an intent to defraud.3 Employees challenging the
constitutionality of racially discriminatory policies in the workplace
must establish discriminatory purpose on the part of their employers.4
This Comment examines the role of motive and intent5 in cases
involving allegations of police brutality, employment discrimination,
and insider trading. It suggests that the centrality of motive and
intent stems from the Court's rights-based, liberal vision;6 that it
1. See generally Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating a provision of
the Alabama Constitution that disfranchised persons convicted of crimes involving moral
turpitude on the ground that the enactment of the provision was motivated by a desire to
discriminate); General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (holding
that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must be premised on proof of intentional discrimination);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (holding
that zoning board's denial of rezoning petition to allow for multiple family dwelling did not
violate the equal protection clause because there was no evidence of discriminatory motive on
the part of the zoning board); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that proof of
discriminatory purpose is necessary to establish a claim of racial discrimination under the fifth
amendment); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (requiring plaintiffs bringing a
Rule lob-5 complaint to show that the defendant acted with intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964) (holding that challengers to New York
apportionment statute failed to prove that the New York legislature was motivated by racial
considerations).
2. City of Canton v. Harris, 409 U.S. 378, 388 (1989).
3. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 199.
4. Washington, 426 U.S. at 247-48.
5. For a discussion of the conceptual differences between the terms "motive" and
"intent," see infra note 9.
6. There is a conceptual tension in political philosophy between rights-oriented,
individualist liberals and critics of liberalism who emphasize common purposes and ends,
reminiscent of Aristotle's focus on human telos. Liberalism is a deontological ethic, which
emphasizes individual rights and duties that override public concerns and collective ends. On
the other hand, communitarianism and civic republicanism are teleological ethics, which
emphasize affirmative community goals, human virtue, and a search for the common good.
See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (formulating a comprehensive analysis
of the liberal model based on the priority of the individual); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (criticizing liberalism's individualist tendencies by proposing a
competing theory based on notions of mutuality and community); Michelman, Law's Republic,
97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) (criticizing liberalism's rights-based approach, and proposing a
theory centered on political participation and dialogue as means to the achievement of civic
virtue and freedom). This Comment explores the tension between liberalism and its
counterparts: communitarianism and civic republicanism. The Court's emphasis on motive
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reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of institutional behavior,
which results in a narrow and impoverished definition of
responsibility.
A. Liberalism's Narrow Vision of Interdependence, Institutions,
and Responsibility
Liberalism emphasizes individual rights and autonomy, viewing
humanity as a collection of autonomous beings free from government
interference.' Because liberalism defines interdependence narrowly,
by limiting the importance of common connections, it also defines
responsibility narrowly, by limiting our obligations to one another.
Liberalism's emphasis on individualism limits our sense of duty to one
another: We are at once alone, independent, and disinterested. This
Comment examines the impact of this individualist vision on the
Court's analysis of various forms of institutional malfunctions: dis-
crimination in the institution of the workplace, brutality in the institu-
tion of the police department, and fraud in the institution of the
market.
This Comment argues that this individualist model has led the
Court to neglect structural elements of institutional behavior. Heav-
ily influenced by a vision of autonomy, the Court rejects the impor-
tance of the ties that bind us-ties that find expression in community
values and faults, such as collective expressions of good will or cor-
ruption. The Court perceives institutions as the sum of their individ-
ual parts, as collections of autonomous beings, who, according to the
liberal ethic, are mutually disinterested and owe very little to one
another.8 Assumptions of limited responsibility and mutual disinter-
est lead the Court to adjudicate as if its only role were to protect
individuals in institutions from the rights and choices of others. Lib-
eralism places the individual ahead of the whole, so that the protec-
and intent reflects a rights-oriented, liberal approach, because it emphasizes the defendant's
right to a neutral framework in which she is held liable only for her individually chosen ends.
For a discussion of liberalism's emphasis on rights, neutrality, and choice as reflected in
caselaw, see infra Section III.
7. For example, Rawls suggests that
[e]ach person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare
of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss
of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not
allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are outweighed by the larger sum of
advantages enjoyed by many.
J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 3-4. Rawls's explanation of justice denies the legitimacy of govern-
ment interference for the sake of a collective conception of the good when that interference
would violate the individuality of an autonomous being.
8. Id. at 13.
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tion of separateness is paramount to the cultivation of social or
communal ties. By following this model, the Court ignores the con-
nections among individuals in a group, causing institutional imperfec-
tions to go unaddressed. For that reason, the Court protects
individualist values, like motive and intent,9 at the expense of institu-
tional values. These judicial preferences reflect the failure of the lan-
guage of liberalism to speak to the institutional aspects of
discrimination in the workplace, of abusive behavior in our police
departments, and of manipulations in the market. When the Court
insists on a showing of motive, it protects the defendant from respon-
sibility for anything she has not chosen and meant to do as an individ-
ual. The Court denies that an individual, as part of a Community of
the workplace, police department, or market, owes a duty to that
Community that stems from something other than motive, and rejects
duties arising from a Community's needs and values. By emphasizing
motive, the Court liberates individuals from responsibility for struc-
tural problems they did not mean to cause, and negates an affirmative
responsibility for attitudes and behavior that hurt other individuals in
the institution.
The Court's liberal conception of justice is not surprising, since
notions of rights and individualism have deep roots in American
political culture. 10 Liberalism's emphasis on individual rights,11 and
9. Though the terms "motive" and "intent" are related, they are not synonymous. For a
discussion of the conceptual and legal differences between motive and intent, see Welch,
Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather
than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1987). "Intent is prospective while motive is
retrospective. Motive addresses the factors that lead into a decision: the reasons upon which a
decision is based, the realities that motivate a decisionmaker. Intent is synonymous with
purpose." Id. at 736. The Court, however, has not always distinguished the terms: "Some of
the Court's opinions employ the terms in a way that seem to suggest their interchangeability."
Id. at 763. "Intent" and "motive" are both used by the Court in ways that suggest identical
visions of justice and of individualism. Whether the Court uses motive to refer to the impetus
for an individual's actions or intent to refer to an individual's ends, it still emphasizes
individual elements over structural effects. Therefore, this Comment treats intent and motive
as elements driven by an identical vision.
10. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights .... That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
Men .... ") (emphasis added); Dahl, On Resolving Certain Impediments to Democracy in the
United States, in THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 230, 231 (R.
Horwitz 3d ed. 1986) ("The first commitment was the one this country made to a liberal
political and constitutional order that gave primacy to the protection of certain political and
civil rights among its citizens.").
11. See, e.g., M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at I ("The liberalism with which I am concerned is
a version of liberalism prominent in the moral and legal and political philosophy of the day: a
liberalism in which the notions of justice, fairness, and individual rights play a central role
.... ") (emphasis added).
[Vol. 45:843
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on government that is neutral toward competing conceptions of the
good, 2 are relied upon to protect against a majoritarian impulse.'
3
Yet, as many critics of liberalism have noted,' 4 the Court's approach
is impoverished because it ignores important aspects of our social
lives. By emphasizing individualism, liberalism ignores interdepen-
dence and community.' 5 The centrality of individual motive in the
Court's jurisprudence is a reflection of an emphasis on the private, on
individualism, and on autonomy. A liberal vision presumes that indi-
viduals are responsible primarily for themselves and their intentions,
not for the systemic problems of their institutions.
This Comment relies on competing visions that reject liberalism's
underlying assumptions of individualism and autonomy. Building on
communitarian notions of mutuality, it proposes a more expansive
notion of responsibility, a broader range of enforceable duties to and
from our institutions. This Comment does not argue that the individ-
ual is unimportant, nor that individual motive is insignificant.
Rather, in the context of institutions, like the workplace, the munici-
pality, and the market, an emphasis on individualism is at best incom-
plete, because institutions exhibit structural problems unattributable
to individual motive, problems to which the Court's narrow vision of
responsibility does not speak. Narrow definitions of responsibility
reject the possibility of imputing a duty to others that stems from
something outside of their intentions. The Court's liberalism does not
address how or why we, as a society and as a community, have obliga-
tions to those around us-obligations that stem from our mutuality,
from the fact that we all benefit from and contribute to our common-
ality. As a result, the Court's recent jurisprudence over-emphasizes
motive at the expense of effects, thereby protecting individuals at the
expense of their commonality. For example, when the Court forces
an employee to show an employer's intentional discrimination regard-
less of discriminatory impact, the Court confirms the notion that the
12. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 3-4.
13. See, e.g., Fallon, What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1695, 1724 (1989) ("[F]ew if any republican revivalists are ultimately willing to eschew
reliance on judicially protected individual rights against local communities--and this reliance
threatens republicanism's claimed distinctiveness.") (footnote omitted); Gutmann,
Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 308, 319 (1985) ("The
enforcement of liberal rights, not the absence of settled community, stands between the Moral
Majority and the contemporary equivalent of witch hunting.").
14. For a discussion of the tension between liberals and their communitarian and civic
republican critics, see infra Section III.
15. See generally M. SANDEL, supra note 6 (arguing that liberalism misconceives the
primacy of justice because it relies on a vision of individuals as autonomous beings independent
of communal ties, history, and friendship).
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defendant employer's right to be responsible only for her chosen ends
overrides the responsibility to her institution. The Court thus denies,
or at least neglects, an affirmative duty to combat structural
discrimination.
B. Is There Institutional Intent?
The Court's insistence on a showing of "institutional intent"
reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of discrimina-
tion and corruption in many of our institutions. In its analysis of
discrimination and corruption, the Court treats institutions as if they
were human beings.16 In police brutality and employment discrimina-
tion cases, it often personifies institutional defendants in search of a
source of collective evil motivation.17  In insider trading cases, the
Court often regards the institution of the market as an aggregate of
individuals, so that only those who actually participate in the opera-
tion of the organization, those individuals who buy or sell securities,
have a right to make a claim."8 The Court's perception of organiza-
tions as persons or aggregates of persons is deficient, however, because
it misunderstands the nature of organizations, whose operations are
seldom attributable to the will or intent of one or several individu-
als.19 Organizations are "both opaque and impermeable,"'2 such that
their function can not be linked with any accuracy to individual
motive.2 1
Corporations and municipalities cannot think, feel, and intend
like people. However, because the Court adjudicates in a language of
individualism, it distorts institutional behavior, imputing both motive
16. For a comprehensive discussion of the law's treatment of organizations, see M. DAN-
COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR A BUREAUCRATIC
SOCIETY (1986) (criticizing legal theory's conception of organizations as persons or clusters of
persons, and proposing a legal theory of organizations that takes into account the complexity
of institutional parties).
17. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (holding that a
showing of racial imbalance is insufficient to make out a disparate impact claim; plaintiffs must
point to specific or particular employment practices which caused the disparate impact) (note
that the Court examines the specific practices of individuals to evaluate the behavior of an
organization); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985) (dictum) (requiring
plaintiffs to show that policymakers consciously chose a police officer training program that
would violate constitutional rights of their constituents).
18. Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 755 (1975) (holding that only
purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to bring a Rule lob-5 claim).
19. Professor Dan-Cohen argues that organizations can act with intent; however, he
suggests that organizational intent is separate from individual will, and he criticizes legal
theory's equating of individual and organizational motive. M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16, at
38-39.
20. Id. at 38.
21. Id.
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and intent to institutions like police departments and corporations.22
The same type of analysis shapes the Court's insider trading jurispru-
dence. Here, the defendant is often an individual accused of an intent
to defraud, 3 so that to speak in terms of motive is not illogical, as it is
in cases where the defendant is a municipality or a corporation. Nev-
ertheless, the Court's insistence on motive reflects a misunderstanding
of the way in which the flow of information in the market can cause
injury to participants. As in the municipality and the workplace,
injury can stem from corruption and inertia, independent of motive.24
Negligence on the part of market participants and carelessness in the
use and distribution of information can distort the institution of the
market. The Court's language of liberalism denies a duty to the mar-
ket, much like it denies a duty to the workplace and to the
municipality.
The selection of police brutality, employment discrimination,
and insider trading cases is not arbitrary. Precisely because they are
substantively unrelated, while still requiring proof of motive, the three
areas epitomize a trend in the Court's reasoning process. Because
they are so different, they suggest that the Court's analysis is
independent of any substantive legal doctrine, and that its reasoning is
instead a function of a particular conception of justice. These three
doctrinal areas exhibit different faces of responsibility and irresponsi-
bility to the Court. Duties to financial markets, municipal police
departments, and workplaces present different types of obligations to
and from different institutions. Yet, because the Court always begins
its analysis from the standpoint of individual motive, it tends to treat
these very different institutions in remarkably similar ways, looking
for intent and conscious choices and ignoring the structural nuances
of the players involved. Thus the Court arrives at very narrow defini-
tions of responsibility, imputing liability only when an injury was con-
sciously chosen by a personified or individualized defendant. A more
22. Whitman, Government Responsibility for Constitutional Torts, 85 MICH. L. REV. 225
(1986) (arguing that individualism as a method of analysis presents an inadequate foundation
for evaluating institutional misconduct). Professor Whitman focuses on constitutional tort
cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For a discussion of many of these cases, see infra text
accompanying notes 48-88.
23. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (action brought against a broker-dealer who
provided investment information to investors). But see Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224
(1988) (action filed against a corporation and some of its directors); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (action filed against an accounting firm).
24. See Phillips, An Essay: Six Competing Currents of Rule lob-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND.
L. REv. 625, 642 n.95 (1988) ("[E]ither where misleading statements have been made or
material facts omitted, the investing public has been injured whether the party who produced
the facts or omitted them acted intentionally, recklessly, or negligently.").
1991]
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sensitive jurisprudence would analyze the workings of the particular
institutions involved, taking into account the benefits and burdens
borne by the players in the dispute, and arriving at a conclusion more
consistent with communitarian values.
C. The Public/Private Problem
The motive requirement in insider trading, police brutality, and
employment discrimination cases conforms with many of liberalism's
basic tenents. Liberalism emphasizes the protection of private inter-
ests, resulting in a tacit hostility to public-rights needs.25 Recent
scholarship has brought out the conceptual inconsistencies in the
notion of separate public and private realms.26 These commentators
argue that no judicial dispute is truly private. Whenever a court pro-
tects or redistributes rights and entitlements, very public things hap-
pen, so that even our definitions of private rights are derived, at least
in part, from public priorities.27 Perhaps not every lawsuit implicates
the characteristics we often associate with public-rights issues, 2s such
as the vindication of public policy objectives through affirmative gov-
ernment action;29 remedies that regulate municipal, institutional, and
25. Many scholars have noted the Court's reluctance to grant relief to public-rights
plaintiffs. See generally Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword: Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 56 (1982) ("I began this essay by posing
the question whether public law litigation, seemingly an expression of a liberal and reformist
ideology in the legal system, would be able to withstand prolonged confrontation with a
Supreme Court whose dominant tenor was neither liberal nor reformist."); Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 346 (1989)
("[M]any courts have enforced a number of Rules in ways that adversely affect public interest
litigants. . . . [F]ederal judges can and should apply the Rules with considerably more
solicitude for public interest litigants .... "); Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the
Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1454 (1988) (analyzing the demise of the
public-rights model as a consequence of our emphasis on individualism: "[T]he rise of
liberalism in the nineteenth century led to the primacy of the private rights model and to
modem standing law .... ").
26. For a discussion of the controversies inherent in the public/private distinction, and of
the conceptual difficulties in separating public from private realms, see generally Kennedy, The
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982)
(arguing that the public/private distinction cannot be taken seriously "as a description, as an
explanation, or as a justification of anything"); Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues:
Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1441, 1445-49 (1982) (arguing that
corporate conduct is shaped by a hybrid of public and private influences that cannot be
distinguished).
27. Paul, Book Review, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 743, 746 (1986) ("[V]irtually every judicial
decision affecting private conduct has an impact on matters arguably of public concern.").
28. For a comprehensive analysis of the elements and characteristics of public law
litigation, see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976).
29. Id. at 1284, 1302 (asserting that relief in a public-rights suit is "forward looking,"
[Vol. 45:843
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social behavior;30 and legislative fact-inquiries that implicate public
policy issues. 31 Nevertheless, every time a court adjudicates, it inter-
venes, abstains, or interprets in ways that draw on value-laden, nor-
mative principles that implicate public values. 32 The Court, however,
has repeatedly ignored its own public role, adjudicating with a defer-
ence to the choices of private actors and to existing distributive enti-
tlements.33 This deference suggests an insensitivity to the actors who
are not beneficiaries of the status quo. The Court's philosophy, based
on the priority of existing private interests, protects only private ele-
ments, such as motive and intent, and neglects institutional concerns
and issues of public policy. 34 Driven by a liberal vision, the Court
imputes responsibility only when private actors, as individuals, inten-
tionally choose to cause harm. The Court has been unable to define
responsibility in broader terms. Therefore, it has been unable to deal
with the public, structural problems of our institutions. The chal-
lenge is to find a way to impute liability justly without relying exclu-
sively on individualist values.
The Court's blind spot to public-rights issues stems at least in
part from a liberal impulse, which focuses so strongly on individual
autonomy: on rights, motives, choices, ends, and privacy. 35 The
shaped along "broadly remedial lines," and has "important consequences for many persons
including absentees," and thus must often be implemented by affirmative government action).
30. See id. at 1297.
31. Id.
32. See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
411 (1989) (arguing that because statutes do not have pre-interpretive meanings, courts
inevitably rely on normative principles in the course of statutory interpretation).
33. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) (tracing the Court's
protection of private interests and existing entitlement to the Lochner era).
34. The Court's recent caselaw exemplifies a reluctance to grant relief to plaintiffs
attempting to vindicate public rights. In the three doctrinal areas analyzed in this Comment,
for example, the Court has dramatically restricted the scope of legitimate actions. As a result,
many plaintiffs with police brutality claims are turning to state courts. See Herman, Beyond
Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1989) ("federal
court refugees" bring their federal claims to state court). The Supreme Court has also
drastically narrowed the scope of legitimate claims for employment discrimination plaintiffs.
See 58 U.S.L.W. 3065 (Aug. 8, 1989) ("A series of civil rights decisions by a conservative
majority of the U.S. Supreme Court making it easier to challenge affirmative action programs
and more difficult to establish claims of employment discrimination highlighted the 1988-1989
term's labor and employment cases."). Insider trading cases show a similar trend, where
standing limitations and narrow definitions of statutory duties have made it more difficult for
plaintiffs to invoke the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1990). See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 731
(1975) (standing limitations); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) (narrow
definitions of duties).
35. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) ("Because of the
dominance of liberalism in this culture, we might think of autonomy as the 'official' liberal
value entailed by the physical, material condition of inevitable separation from the other:
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Court draws on its own individualist vision which neglects that which
is beyond the individual, ignoring the institution, the community, or
"the whole."' 36 Simply stated, the Court is hostile to public aspects of
litigation because it is not accustomed to thinking in terms any larger
than the individual. Liberalism speaks to problems of separateness
and autonomy, driving the Court to protect those private individualist
interests, while ignoring, or rejecting, public needs. In the Court's
hostility to the public and in its embrace of the individual, we find one
of the roots of the centrality of motive. Just as liberalism denies the
significance of the whole, the Court denies the importance of struc-
ture, and emphasizes individual ends, volition, and motive at the
expense of community.37 Note that the centrality of motive is in a
sense a distortion, resulting from the Court's inability to acknowledge
a relevant, experiential aspect of our lives. The Court speaks in terms
of motive when issues call for institutional restructuring, largely
because it is blind to the public aspect of problems we face. "Distor-
tions occur when [public rights] cases are treated in terms of the sche-




Motive also stems from the Court's narrow interpretations of
congressional intent. In each of the areas discussed in this Comment,
plaintiffs usually bring actions under federal statutes with broad pub-
lic policy objectives. 39 However, both the legislative text and history
separation from the other entails my freedom from him, and that in turn entails my political
right to autonomy.").
36. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLmcs Book 1, at 37 (C. Lord trans. 1984) ("The city is thus
prior by nature to the household and to each of us. For the whole must of necessity be prior to
the part .... ").
37. Winter, supra note 25, at 1393 ("When we persist in seeing only the individual as a
cognizable social unit, we limit also the recognizable interests that are available for our
consideration either in adjudication or legislation.").
38. Id. at 1460. See also Chayes, supra note 25, at 8 ("I[T]he Court has tried to construct a
metaphor or effigy of the traditional lawsuit. The doctrinal output of this approach is
incoherent or inappropriate, or both, and diverts attention from the considerations that ought
to be taken into account.").
39. In the context of insider trading, plaintiffs invoke Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(1990), promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa
(1990), to combat fraud and deception in the use of public information, and to encourage full
disclosure. See generally Comment, The Basics of Disclosure: The Market for Information in
the Market for Corporate Control, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1021 (1989) (analyzing different
models of disclosure in preliminary merger negotiations in terms of congressional objectives of
disclosure and fairness). Victims of police brutality combat municipal abuses of power
through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), enacted to provide a remedy for constitutional violations
committed under color of state law. See generally Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
[Vol. 4,5:843
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shed little light on whether or not Congress meant for motive to be an
essential element of plaintiffs' cases.' Gaps in the text and history of
Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1 (1985) (analyzing the role of section 1983 in the protection of individual rights, and
urging that its viability not be restricted for the sake of efficiency). Finally, employees
challenging allegedly discriminatory practices in the workplace can use a variety of statutory
provisions, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17
(1988), which was enacted "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). Employees can
also challenge certain discriminatory practices by invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982), which
provides that "[a]ll persons... shall have the same rights in every State and Territory to make
and enforce contracts .... " See generally Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction
History, and the Proper Scope of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541 (1989) (arguing that the
statute was intended to reach private discrimination).
40. For a discussion of Congress's vision of motive in the Title VII context, see Sunstein,
supra note 32, at 422 (Title VII's "basic prohibition of 'discrimination' provides no guidance
on the role of discriminatory effects, the appropriate burdens of proof and production, and the
mechanisms for filtering out discriminatory treatment"). But see Gold, Griggs' Folly: An
Essay of the Theory, Problems, and Origin of the Adverse Impact Definition of Employment
Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7 INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985) (arguing
that Title VII was directed exclusively at purposeful discrimination). For a discussion of gaps
in congressional vision in section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and in Rule
lOb-5, see Kaler, Scienter After Hochfelder: Recklessness as a Standard in Rule lob-5 Private
Damage Actions, 6 J. CORP. L. 337, 337 (1981) ("Much of the confusion in this area is a
consequence of the development of the lOb-5 remedy in the courts. When Congress passed the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 10(b) was added as a 'catch-all' provision .... ")
(footnote omitted); Note, Recklessness and the Rule lob-5 Scienter Standard After Hochfelder,
48 FORDHAM L. REV. 817, 819 n.9 (1980) ("IT]he legislative history of § 10(b) does little to
clarify the elements of a private cause of action, because the federal courts implied the action
from § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 using a statutory tort theory."). These commentators suggest
that Congress was not concerned with the elements of a cause of action under Rule lOb-5.
Motive, or scienter, is such an element.
For a discussion of Congressional purpose and legislative history of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see
Mead, 42 US.C. § 1983 Municipal Liability: The Monell Sketch Becomes a Distorted Picture,
65 N.C.L. REV. 517 (1987) (arguing that the Court mistakenly rejected respondeat superior
municipal liability under section 1983). Under a respondeat superior theory, municipal
employers (such as police departments) would be responsible for the constitutional violations
of their employees acting under color of state law. Motive would play no part. Professor
Mead argues that "the Court unjustifiably relied on statutory silence to support its rejection of
respondeat superior." Id. at 538. Thus, gaps, or silence in congressional history, resulted in
the imposition of an artificial motive requirement in section 1983 jurisprudence. This result is
not necessarily consistent with Congress's purposes in 1871, when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to "extend its broad remedies to all persons deprived of federally protected rights under color
of state law." Id. at 518-19 (42d Cong., 1st Sess. 68 app. (1871), quoting CONG. GLOBE).
The text and history of 42 U.S.C § 1981 is also ambiguous. In General Bldg. Contractors
Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982), the Supreme Court held that section 1981 can be
violated only by purposeful discrimination. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was based on a
narrow reading of legislative history. He argued that because the statute did not refer to intent
or purpose, and because it had been enacted in response to "blatant" instances of
discrimination, Congress must have meant for it to cover only intentional acts. Id. at 388-89.
Despite Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent, which attacked Rehnquist's reading of legislative
history, General Building Contractors has not been forcefully challenged by commentators.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the statutes have given the Court a great deal of leeway in creating a
federal common law based on motive. This jurisprudence, in its illu-
mination of judicial visions of justice, also illustrates the difficulty of
drawing from congressional silence an understanding of congressional
vision.
Congressional visions of justice are difficult to pinpoint precisely
because Congress itself is an institution, whose members are driven by
unidentifiable structural biases and institutional problems, many of
which are conspicuously absent from statutory text.41 It is only to the
extent that congressional statutes like Title VII, sections 1981 and
1983, and Rule lOb-5 have explicit regulatory objectives that it is pos-
sible to determine congressional purpose. On one level, such enact-
ments reveal certain anti-liberal tendencies in the Congress. As an
institution, it responds to communities and constituencies as well as
to individual problems. Congress may be less drawn to the individu-
alist model, largely because its function is to consider broad social
remedies. By comparison, adjudication is a different phenomenon,
designed to resolve more specific questions. Nevertheless, there may
be room for communitarian concerns in their resolution.
Given the gaps in statutory language, judicial determinations of
congressional intent must also incorporate the Court's vision of jus-
tice. Recent case law exhibits very narrow interpretations of statutory
language and purpose, a type of literalism that limits the potential
effect of regulatory measures in an effort to protect private ordering
and established entitlements.42 In one sense, this type of judicial
approach is consistent with the liberal model, which, in its most basic
form, rejects the legitimacy of any public policy goals that intrude on
the inviolability of individual ends and preferences.43 The Court's
Whether Congress meant for motive to be an element in section 1981 actions is by no means
clear; however, the doctrine seems well settled.
41. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 433 ("[L]egislative intent, like legislative purpose, is largely
a fiction in hard cases-a problem aggravated by the extraordinary difficulties of aggregating
the 'intentions' of a multimember body.").
42. Id. at 484 (arguing that recent cases suggest a trend away from the protection of
disadvantaged groups, a trend "perhaps rooted in a competing norm of private autonomy").
43. West, Taking Preferences Seriously, 64 TUL. L. REV. 659, 661 (1990) [hereinafter
West, Taking Preferences] (criticizing a conservative, libertarian tendency to "take preferences
as inviolable in the two spheres in which they are most clearly revealed-private contracting
and public lawmaking"). Professor West does not equate conservative legalism with
liberalism, although she does base a conservative deference to contractual preferences on
libertarian principles. Id. at 660. This is not to suggest that the present Court exhibits judicial
restraint, since in fact many recent cases reveal a conservative activism geared at the protection
of existing entitlements. See West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH.
L. REV. 641, 651-52 (1990) [hereinafter West, Constitutionalism] (arguing that libertarian
judicial thought has been replaced by a conservative constitutionalism, which "is grounded in
and united by an aversion to the redistributive normative authority of the political state and a
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narrow reading of statutes reveals an attempt to achieve neutrality by
allowing for the expression of individual rights and norms, but
rejecting the imposition of collective values in the form of broad reme-
dial readings of legislation." Neutrality is an illusory goal, however,
because in filling the gaps of statutory language, the Court inevitably
draws on normative, contextual principles4" to distribute public enti-
tlements. 46 In their evaluations of Congressional motive, purpose,
and history, courts make normative choices, which in recent years
have favored the liberal values of individualism and autonomy. Judi-
cial emphasis on intent is an example of that type of normative choice,
born of gaps in Congressional direction and driven by a liberal voice.
E. Towards a Communitarian Definition of Responsibility: Bearing
the Burden for the Unintended
Liberalism creates two bases of intent jurisprudence: (1) the
Court's protection of the private realm, and (2) its narrow reading of
remedial statutes. Both are continuing themes throughout this Com-
ment. The first base justifies the centrality of motive. The Court can
understand holding an individual liable for private, intentional acts,
while it cannot understand holding an individual or an organization
liable for the public problems of institutions. The second base
explains the Court's methodology. By interpreting statutes narrowly,
to impute liability only when the defendant intended to cause injury,
the Court protects the status quo and limits notions of responsibility.
commitment to the preservation, or conservation, of existing social, economic, and legal
entitlements and structures"). In rejecting judicial implementation of broad remedial statutes,
the Court may not be deferring to preferences as expressed in federal statutes. Congress may
have intended for the implementation of social reconstruction. In rejecting these goals, the
Court succumbs to some, but not all, of liberalism's basic tenets. Consistent with the
libertarian view, the Court rejects normative conceptions of the good imposed by the state.
However, by neglecting, or detaching itself from legislative preferences, the Court contradicts
a libertarian mandate through a conservative version of judicial activism.
44. For a discussion of liberalism's emphasis on neutrality, see M. SANDEL, supra note 6,
at 1 (Sandel's definition of the thesis of liberalism shows the importance of neutrality:
"[S]ociety, being composed of a plurality of persons, each with his own aims, interests, and
conceptions of the good, is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not
themselves presuppose any particular conception of the good .... ); Rawls, The Domain of the
Political and Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 233, 255 (1989) ("The rule of law
exists so long as such legal institutions and their associated practices (variously specified) are
conducted in a reasonable way in accordance with the political values that apply to them:
impartiality and consistency ....").
45. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 411.
46. See Sunstein, supra note 33, at 918-19 (arguing that the Court imposes its own
requirement of neutrality that preserves the status quo and takes existing entitlement and
distributions of wealth as inviolate and natural). Professor Sunstein warns that this definition
of neutrality perpetuates a status quo that is artificial and therefore not deserving of such
fervent protection. Id.
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Section II analyzes the emergence of motive in police brutality,
employment discrimination, and insider trading cases, all of which
evince the lack of, and the need for, an effects-oriented judiciary. The
police brutality and employment discrimination cases show how the
Court uses motive to define breach of duty by an institution. The
insider trading cases show how the Court uses motive to define duties
to an institution. In each of these doctrinal areas, the Court's defini-
tion of responsibility is impoverished, because it overemphasizes
motive, protecting individualist values and private ordering, with a
reluctance to implement broad public policy prerogatives. In police
brutality and employment discrimination cases, the Court personifies
institutional defendants like workplaces and municipal police depart-
ments. Conversely, in insider trading cases, the Court treats the insti-
tution of the market as if it were merely an aggregate of individuals,4"
to be held liable only for their intentional acts against one another.
This personification is a prerequisite to attributing motive, and it is
consistent with liberalism's limited vision of responsibility. Section II
shows how the Court's emphasis on the private, and its narrow statu-
tory analysis, have resulted in the emergence of motive as a central
principle that overrides the call for institutional restructuring. Sec-
tion III analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of motive, suggesting
that the Court's vision is conceptually flawed in its limiting and con-
straining embrace of liberalism. This Section attacks the underlying
individualist assumptions that drive the intent standard, arguing that
these assumptions distort our jurisprudence by emphasizing motive,
choice, and purpose. Finally, Section IV suggests a model of jurispru-
dence that emphasizes an effects-oriented approach and a departure
from the Court's rights-based vision, constructing an alternate defini-
tion of responsibility grounded in a critique of liberalism.
II. THE STANDARD OF INTENT IN PRACTICE
A. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Negligent Training of Police Officers
In recent years, plaintiffs have often invoked 42 U.S.C. § 1983's
broad scope in attempts to curb instances of police brutality and other
municipal abuses of power.4" Congress enacted section 1983 to pro-
47. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16, at 15 (criticizing legal theory's treatment of
organizations as individual human beings, either through personification or through
aggregation).
48. See generally City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (action against a
municipality for failing to provide necessary medical attention to a suspect in police custody);
City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987) (action against a municipality, alleging
negligent training of its police officers); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)
(action against a county, alleging that it had violated plaintiff's fourth and fourteenth
[Vol. 45:843
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vide a federal remedy against violations of civil and constitutional
rights by "persons" acting under color of state law.4 9 This section
examines how the Supreme Court's interpretation of section 1983 has
stripped it of much of its usefulness in the context of police brutality
cases. In its analysis of breach of duty under section 1983, the Court
has developed a federal common law that emphasizes a narrow vision
of responsibility, imputing liability only when police departments can
be shown to have consciously and intentionally violated the constitu-
tional rights of constituents. The Court's seminal interpretation of
section 1983 in Monell v. Department of Social Services,5" which set
the stage for the personification of municipal defendants and for the
imposition of a standard of intent, provides a perspective for analyz-
ing recent case law involving allegations of negligent training of police
officers.
1. MONELL V. DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES: WHEN IS A
CITY A PERSON?
In Monell, the Supreme Court held that a municipality is a "per-
son" who can be sued under section 1983 when the allegedly uncon-
stitutional action implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated
by that body's officers.5 A municipality also may be liable if a consti-
tutional violation occurs as a result of a municipal custom. 52 The
Court relied on the legislative debates surrounding the passage of sec-
tion 1983 to conclude that Congress meant the terms "any person" to
include both natural and legal persons.53 Because only persons can
have intent, the Court's reasoning set the stage for the personification
amendment rights); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985) (action against
police officer and municipality, alleging deprivation of constitutional rights); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (action against a municipality that compelled
pregnant women to take unpaid leaves of absences before they were medically required); Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (action against Mayor of Philadelphia, its Police Commissioner,
and others, alleging a pattern of police mistreatment of minority citizens).
49. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
50. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
51. Id. at 690.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 683. "Our analysis of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1871
compels the conclusion that Congress did intend municipalities and other local government
units to be included among those persons to whom § 1983 applies." Id. at 690.
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of a municipal defendant with the requisite state of mind essential to
motivation: "In Monell the Court seemed to be looking for something
parallel to an individual's decision to act, some indication of will or
intent.
'5 4
The contours of Monell's policy or custom requirement have
been the source of much of the Court's analysis since 1978. The facts
of Monell did not call for a specific definition of policy or custom: A
class of female employees sued the City of New York alleging that an
official city policy compelled unpaid maternity leaves before they were
medically required." Because the policy in Monell was facially
unconstitutional, the Court did not have to consider the parameters of
other policies or customs that would give rise to section 1983 liabil-
ity. 6 In cases of police brutality, however, the challenged policy or
custom is rarely unconstitutional on its face. Usually, plaintiffs allege
that a municipal policy of negligent training violated their rights5 7 -
that a municipality applied a constitutional policy in an unconstitu-
tional manner. The question invariably involves an analysis of
whether a training, hiring, or operating procedure falls within the
Monell parameters for municipal liability. Courts routinely apply
Monell's framework of a personified municipal entity to allegations of
negligent training. Consequently, victims of police brutality must
show that a person-like bureaucracy intended to do harm.58
2. SECTION 1983 SINCE MONELL. WHEN DOES A CITY, AS A
PERSON, MEAN TO DO HARM?
Monell demonstrates the conceptual problems that arise when
courts attribute human, individualist characteristics to a bureaucratic
54. Whitman, supra note 22, at 238.
55. 436 U.S. at 661.
56. Id. at 695 ("[W]e have no occasion to address, and do not address, what the full
contours of municipal liability under § 1983 may be .... [W]e expressly leave further
development of this action to another day.").
57. See generally City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 262 (1987) (respondent argued
that the City of Springfield should be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because it had a
policy or custom of inadequately training its police officers); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 811, 820 (1985) (respondent claimed that Oklahoma City's policy of police training
and supervision resulted in inadequate training leading to constitutional violations).
58. Since Monell, the Court has addressed the issue of whether a state or territory can also
be a "person" for purposes of section 1983. See Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 110 S. Ct. 1737 (1990)
(holding that neither the territory of Guam, nor one of its officers acting in an official capacity,
is a person for purposes of section 1983); Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989) (finding that neither state nor state officials acting in their official capacities are
"persons" within the meaning of section 1983). This Comment is limited to section 1983 as it
pertains to municipal abuses of power, only because state and territorial abuses of power have
not engendered as developed a jurisprudence.
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municipal entity. The effect is to emphasize motivation, a human
characteristic, at the expense of structural problems that also may
cause injury of constitutional dimensions." Since Monell, the Court
has exacerbated this incongruity in a series of decisions that have
transformed municipal defendants into personified, thinking and feel-
ing entities.
In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle," the Court redrew the con-
tours of municipal liability under section 1983. The plaintiff in Tuttle
was the widow of a man shot by a police officer.61 The complaint
alleged that the training curriculum of the Oklahoma City police
force was grossly inadequate. The Supreme Court reversed the dis-
trict court judgment because the jury instructions "allowed the jury to
impose liability on the basis of such a single incident without the ben-
efit of the additional evidence."62 The Court found it improper that
the jury could establish liability without "proof of a single action
taken by a municipal policymaker.
63
Had the Supreme Court simply reversed on the basis of the jury
instructions, Tuttle would be of little significance. The opinion, how-
ever, is rich with language analyzing and defining the contours of
municipal liability under section 1983. In discussing the facts of Tut-
tie, Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted that the link between the
alleged negligent training and the violation of the plaintiffs' constitu-
tional rights was tenuous." According to Rehnquist, inadequate
training creates liability only if it was the result of a "conscious
choice-that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a
training program which would prove inadequate."65 Rehnquist's nar-
row interpretation of the contours of the word "policy" is dicta
59. See Whitman, supra note 22, at 226.
[T]he perspective adopted from tort encourages the Justices to convert the
problem of institutional morality into one of individual morality; tort language
leads them to look for individual choices or motives, for an actor or a "mind"
that can be evaluated .... [Tihe possibility of looking at an institution as a unit
distinct from the separate individuals who compose it is not considered. For
example, the Justices fail to see that injuries can be brought about quite
inadvertently through the workings of institutional structures-through the
massing or fragmentation of authority, or by the creation of a culture in which
responses and a sense of responsibility are distorted.
Id.
60. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
61. Id. at 811.
62. Id. at 821.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 823.
65. Id.
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because the issue of jury instructions was dispositive.6 6 However,
Tuttle took Monell's implicit personification of the defendant one step
further by suggesting not just that a city can be a "person" for pur-
poses of section 1983, but also that it must be capable of making "con-
scious choices."
Tuttle requires the categorization of a defendant municipality as
a conscious, thinking human being. 67 The conscious choice require-
ment makes it very difficult to combat many institutional imperfec-
tions, like inertia, corruption, or mistake, even though they are often
the driving force behind constitutional violations, and even though
they are often bases for individual liability.68 In addition, Monell and
Tuttle both suggest a particular vision of the municipal defendant.
Both cases assume that an institutional defendant cannot be culpable
without intent, ignoring injury that stems from inertia, racism, and
corruption.
The Court again addressed section 1983 and allegations of police
misconduct in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,69 which held that a deci-
sion by a municipal policymaker on a single occasion may give rise to
liability. 70 The plaintiff in Pembaur was a physician who had been
under investigation for fraudulently accepting checks from welfare
agencies.7 1 He alleged that deputy sheriffs and police officers, pursu-
ant to a prosecutor's instructions, violated his rights under the fourth
and fifteenth amendments by forcibly searching his clinic without a
search warrant.72 In its analysis, the Court emphasized that section
1983 liability attaches only where "a deliberate choice to follow a
course of action is made from among various alternatives by the offi-
cial or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to
the subject matter in question. ' 73 The Court found that the prosecu-
66. See Whitman, supra note 22, at 239 ("The holding in Tuttle is not unremarkable given
Monell's rejection of vicarious liability.... The more interesting, and more troubling, aspects
of the Tuttle opinions lie in the various remarks about what would be evidence of institutional
error.").
67. Id. at 241 (Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion assumed that liability could only be
based on a municipal defendant's "state of mind."). See generally M. DAN-COHEN, supra note
16 (criticizing the law's personification of organizations).
68. See Whitman, supra note 22, at 242-43 ("No Justice in Tuttle welcomed the possibility
of looking with some flexibility into the effects of institutional structures."); Note, Municipal
Liability for Police Misconduct: Must Victims Now Prove Intent?, 97 YALE L.J. 448, 458 (1988)
(arguing that a judicially imposed intent requirement reveals a fundamental misunderstanding
of how municipalities cause constitutional violations).
69. 475 U.S. 469.
70. Id. at 480.
71. Id. at 471.
72. Id. at 474.
73. Id. at 483-84.
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tor was such a policymaker, and that his order to forcibly enter
Pembaur's clinic could give rise to section 1983 liability.74 Pembaur
shows that the Court is not always hostile to section 1983 claims, and
that it is more willing to attach liability when wrongdoing can be
attributed to an individual decision maker acting on conscious
choices. This is what made Pembaur an easy case. After Pembaur,
however, section 1983 jurisprudence was still unable to account for
institutional violations as distinguished from those of individuals.
In City of Canton v. Harris,75 the Court recognized that section
1983 liability did not have to be based on an unconstitutional policy.
7 6
Inadequate police training could trigger the policy or custom require-
ment, but only where "failure to train amounts to deliberate indiffer-
ence." '7 7 In Harris, the plaintiff alleged a violation of her right to
adequate medical care while in police custody.7" The Court conceded
that a policy that is not facially unconstitutional can give rise to sec-
tion 1983 liability. However, the plaintiff must prove intent in the
form of "deliberate indifference." 7 9 In explaining the "deliberate
indifference" standard, the majority noted that it may be illogical to
assume that a city would consciously and deliberately institute a pol-
icy of not training its officers.8" The Court then conceded that struc-
tural imperfections may, in some circumstances, satisfy the
"deliberate indifference" standard:
[I]t may happen that in light of the duties assigned to specific
officers or employees the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of
constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reason-
ably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.8"
Like its predecessors, Harris is logically, linguistically, and con-
ceptually inconsistent with the notion of an institutional defendant.8 2
The section 1983 cases perceive municipal defendants through a pri-
vate-rights lens. The defendant is a personified bureaucracy capable
of making "conscious choices" with "deliberate indifference." For
the Court, section 1983 does not impose a sense of responsibility on
74. Id. at 486.
75. 498 U.S. 378 (1989).
76. Id. at 387.
77. Id. at 388.
78. Id. at 381.
79. Id. at 388.
80. Id. at 390.
81. Id.
82. See generally Whitman, supra note 22 (criticizing the Court's section 1983 doctrine for
its emphasis on motivational requirements and for its blindness to the nature of institutional
defendants).
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the participants of these institutions. As long as police officers act
with good or even indifferent intentions, they and their institution are
not held accountable for the structural imperfections of the collective.
By personifying the institution of the police department, the Court
misses the nonpersonal ways in which such an institution can bring
harm to its constituents. 83  The Court's inability to distinguish
between individual behavior and the interaction of individuals in a
community or institution illustrates its blindness to the public dimen-
sions of litigation. The Court can understand a private individual's
intent, but not the public structural characteristics of the problem.
The Court could punish a policymaker in Pembaur because it could
easily link the plaintiff's injury to an individual's conscious, inten-
tional decision. By contrast, in cases like Tuttle and Harris, where
there was no individual motive, the Court adjudicated as if the rele-
vant institutions were individuals. The Court's individualist, private-
rights lens refuses to recognize a legal responsibility when the institu-
tion of a police department breaches its responsibility through negli-
gent training and corruption. A narrow vision of responsibility based
on intent imputes liability only in cases like Pembaur. If injury stems
from the failure of the organization as a collective to fulfill its obliga-
tions, the Court offers no redress, since it finds no individual to blame.
The history and text of section 1983 leaves a lot of leeway for
judicial interpretation and implementation of federal common law.84
In its recent interpretations of section 1983, the Court has used its
leeway to create a jurisprudence that protects a particular set of val-
ues, such as individualism, autonomy, and intent. Many commenta-
tors argue that these stringent, motive-centered requirements are
inconsistent with legislative history and purpose.8 Section 1983 was
83. Id. at 259.
The government, like other institutions, operates through structures that direct
and dispose of power. These can injure grievously when deliberately used by
individual human beings to do harm. And they can injure just as seriously
through inertia, direction of energy to narrow goals, and oversight in the design
of institutional structures. It is in this sense that focus on institutional structures
may expand our sensitivity to previously disregarded harms.
Id.
84. Sunstein, supra note 32, at 421-22 ("[Slection 1983 is silent on many important
questions, including available defenses, burdens of pleading and persuasion, and exhaustion
requirements. Because of the textual silence, judges must fill the gaps. To this extent, the
statute delegates power to make common law.") (citations omitted).
85. For example, Professor Mead argues that the Court's rejection of respondeat superior
liability under section 1983 is inconsistent with both the language and history of the statute).
Mead, supra note 40, at 532. If respondeat superior liability were acceptable under section
1983, intent or motive would play no part because the defendant police department would be
liable for the acts of an officer, by virtue of the employer-employee relationship, regardless of
motive or intent. Another commentator notes:
[Vol. 45:843
RESPONSIBILITY AND INTENT
passed in 1871 to combat the racially discriminatory acts of many
southern states and in reaction to their failure to control violence per-
petrated by the Ku Klux Klan.86 Part of the problem is that Congress
was not very clear. The drafters did not explain to what extent we are
responsible today for the legacy of slavery, centuries of state promul-
gated discrimination, and the racial acts of the Ku Klux Klan. Lib-
eral notions of motive recognize no duty to compensate for the effects
of centuries of discrimination because they are not intentional acts of
the present, even though they are born of intentional acts of the past.
A communitarian perspective, however, would recognize a duty to
combat the effects of past intentional discrimination, because the com-
munity still feels its effects.
It is much easier, however, to criticize a limited, motive-centered
vision of responsibility than it is to define the contours of a broader
notion of responsibility without motive. It is unlikely that we would
impute responsibility for all acts of discrimination, corruption, and
fraud. That would make every police department liable for the acts of
any bad officer; every community responsible for the imperfections of
its members; every one of us responsible for the failure of our socie-
ties. Collective responsibility is a greedy concept because it threatens
to become global by holding each of us liable for the improper behav-
ior of individuals whom we cannot influence or control.8 7 However,
liberalism's impoverished version of responsibility--of rights without
a sense of civic duty-threatens our freedom as well.88 The remainder
of Section II analyzes two other doctrinal areas that grapple with the
tension between narrow notions of responsibility based on motive, on
the one hand, and the call for institutional restructuring, on the other.
The discourse suggests a just and novel conception of responsibility.
[S]ection 1983 was created to give citizens a remedy where their local
government failed to protect their rights....
The legislative debates offer no hint that the authors of the provision wished
to reach only the actions-as opposed to the omissions-of local authorities....
Nor is there any indication that the statute was meant to cover only
intentional deprivations of rights.
Note, supra note 68, at 460.
86. Mead, supra note 40, at 517-19.
87. See Fain, Some Moral Infirmities of Justice, in INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE MASSACRE AT MY LAI 17, 21 (P. French ed. 1972).
88. See West, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43 (1990). Professor West compares America's sense of freedom through
individualism with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's theory of freedom through a
combination of individualism and civic responsibility. Id. at 63. She notes that "[t]he
emergence of a vital liberal and individualistic tradition in Eastern Europe, firmly grounded
not only in the rights tradition but also in an ideal of citizen responsibility, gives us at least the
opportunity to reflect on such a needed change in focus." Id. at 102.
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The challenge is to know how and when to impute liability in a man-
ner which makes us accountable to one another, without instilling a
very real fear that every one of our actions could make us liable for a
breach of responsibility.
B. Employment Discrimination
1. THE PARAMETERS OF THE STANDARD OF INTENT: FROM
GRIGGS TO WARDS COVE
A plaintiff alleging employment discrimination under Title VII
can recover by showing either that discrimination occurred as a result
of an improper motive or by showing that an employer's practices
resulted in discriminatory effects.8 9 This Section examines how recent
case law has blurred the distinction between disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment by introducing elements of intent into the disparate
impact arena.' The introduction of motive has increased the burden
for plaintiffs, who must attribute human characteristics, like motive
89. The Court acknowledges a disparate impact/disparate treatment dichotomy in Title
VII jurisprudence. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 668 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Decisions of this Court and other federal courts repeatedly have recognized that
while the employer's burden in a disparate treatment case is simply one of coming forward
with evidence of legitimate business purpose, its burden in a disparate impact case is proof of
an affirmative defense of business necessity."). This dichotomy is blurred through the
imposition of a motivational requirement in disparate impact cases where motive ought not be
an element of the plaintiff's claim. The Court is more willing to recognize the legitimacy of a
claim alleging discriminatory purpose. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(holding that where a plaintiff shows that her employer's actions were largely motivated by
gender, the defendant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision without taking gender into account). Not all victims of discriminatory
effects can bring disparate impact actions. The Court has refused to extend disparate impact
jurisprudence far beyond the realm of Title VII. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v.
Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375 (1982) (holding that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 must be
grounded on proof of intentional discrimination); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(holding that discriminatory motive is a necessary element of constitutional employment
discrimination actions challenging government employers).
90. Many scholars have noted and criticized the Court's imposition of motivational
requirements in disparate impact employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Freeman,
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978) (criticizing the Court's imposition of
a motive requirement in employment discrimination cases brought under the fifth or
fourteenth amendments); Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 355 (1987) (arguing that the Court's current
notions of improper motive do not confront deeply ingrained racism, and that courts must
speak to "the unconscious racism that underlies much of the racially disproportionate impact
of governmental policy"); Fischl, Job Bias Barrage, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1989, at S12
(arguing that the Supreme Court's employment decisions of the 1988-1989 term suggest an
insensitivity to and misunderstanding of the nature of discrimination in employment, and
criticizing the Court's view of discrimination as a series of discrete, intentional acts rather than
as a structural, deeply ingrained social illness).
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and good faith, to inanimate entities like corporate and institutional
defendants.
Both employment discrimination and police brutality cases illus-
trate the Court's inability to understand and analyze institutional
wrongdoing. 91 In both contexts, the defendant described by the Court
is not reflective of any experiential reality. It is an institution personi-
fied by human characteristics; an entity incapable of showing true
motive. By emphasizing the defendant's intent rather than the impact
of the defendant's actions, the Court ignores the practical realities of
deeply imbedded structural racism and sexism,92 perpetuating a
flawed vision of institutional behavior. Moreover, the Court's cultiva-
tion of the liberal emphasis on autonomy and individualism limits our
notions of responsibility and discourages institutional restructuring.
In the early 1970's, the Supreme Court was more sensitive to the
need to vindicate social wrongs inflicted on large minority interests.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,93 the Court confronted a standardized
test that effectively excluded minorities from certain employment
positions. The Court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohib-
ited the use of employment practices that are discriminatory in effect,
regardless of the intent of the employer: "The Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an
employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibited.
94
The Court emphasized the underlying purposes of Title V11 95
and the need to attack centuries of discrimination. 96 Its reasoning
stressed the importance of ameliorating the status of the victim of
discrimination, not to neutralize the behavior of the employer.97 The
Griggs Court attempted to do more than put a bandage on the prob-
91. See Whitman, supra note 22, at 276. See generally M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16.
92. See Lawrence, supra note 90, at 322; Fischl, supra note 90, at 513.
93. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
94. Id. at 431.
95. Id. at 429-30. The Court concluded that "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment
of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group
of white employees over other employees." Id.
96. Id. at 430 (criticizing the use of standardized tests because they fail to account for the
historical reality of segregation).
97. See Freeman, supra note 90, at 1052-57 (distinguishing between the Court's "victim"
and "perpetrator" approaches to racial discrimination). The Griggs Court adopted a "victim"
perspective, which suggests that the resolution of the problem of discrimination requires the
removal of its associated structural conditions. See id. at 1093-99. After Griggs, the Court
emphasized a "perpetrator" perspective that ignores the status of the victim and only attempts
to neutralize specific violations. See id. at 1118.
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lem of discrimination. It looked beyond the intent of the offending
party in an attempt to restructure social attitudes by proscribing prac-
tices that contradict Title VII's mandate. Griggs is significant in its
exposition of a type of reasoning that the Court has abandoned.
Instead of focusing on the defendant's motive, the Court was decid-
edly teleological. It embraced a particular value (eliminating discrim-
ination), and de-emphasized the autonomy of the defendant.
Additionally, Griggs introduced a broad notion of responsibility to
employment law. Employers would breach a legal duty if their poli-
cies resulted in a racial imbalance, regardless of their intent. The idea
that employers are responsible for the racial make-up of their enter-
prises suggests that individuals might, in some circumstances, owe
more than just good intentions to one another.
Since Griggs, the Court has gradually abandoned the victim per-
spective and its emphasis on structural discrimination. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green9" and Washington v. Davis99 signaled the
beginning of the Court's detachment from the broad reconstructive
position it adopted in Griggs. Both McDonnell Douglas and Washing-
ton exhibit a disregard for institutional problems of race not attributa-
ble to motive or intent. 1° This methodology came full circle in
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 0 which established the parame-
ters for the Court's intent jurisprudence in Title VII actions.
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court crystallized the burdens of
proof for private, non-class action Title VII suits involving purposeful
racial discrimination. Plaintiffs alleging racial discrimination must
first establish a prima facia case by showing that they belong to a
racial minority, that they were rejected in spite of their qualifications,
and that their employer continued to seek applicants with the same
qualifications. The burden then shifts to the employer who must
show a non-discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. If the
employer meets that burden, the plaintiff can then attempt to show
that the employer's excuse was pretextual. 10 2 In McDonnell Douglas,
an employee alleged that his discharge was racially motivated.0 3 The
framework of burdens of proof above was designed to determine
98. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
99. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
100. For a discussion of Washington's disregard for institutional racism independent of
motive, see infra text accompanying notes 112-17. For a discussion of McDonnell Douglas's
disregard for institutional racism independent of motive, see infra notes 105-07 and
accompanying text.
101. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
102. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
103. Id. at 792.
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whether the plaintiff can show improper motive through its conse-
quences. Recent cases, however, have transferred the McDonnell
Douglas test to the disparate impact arena, so that plaintiffs who used
to prevail through a Griggs showing of disparate impact are now
forced to satisfy the elements of McDonnell Douglas's motive-cen-
tered framework of shifting burdens. °4 McDonnell Douglas illus-
trates the Court's departure from Griggs's effects-oriented approach
to questions of discrimination. More importantly, however, McDon-
nell Douglas's conceptual framework, originally designed for the dis-
parate treatment plaintiff, has been transferred to the disparate impact
arena.
McDonnell Douglas took the first step away from the effects-ori-
ented approach of Griggs through a subtle shift in emphasis. Instead
of focusing on the effects of the employer's practices, the Court looked
at the intent and actions of the individual employer. The Court justi-
fied its deviation by distinguishing McDonnell Douglas: "Griggs was
rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and
background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond their
control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on
such citizens for the remainder of their lives." 10 The Court distin-
guished the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, reasoning that he repre-
sented an individual claim against the discriminatory behavior of his
employer and thus did not implicate broader social interests. 106 The
Court's distinction is perplexing because the plaintiff in McDonnell
Douglas was as much a representative of minority interests as were
the plaintiffs in Griggs.°7 Moreover, McDonnell Douglas focused on
motive not because the plaintiff represented individual interests, but
because improper motive was the primary allegation of the complaint.
The Court's unwillingness to see the plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas as
a representative of legitimate collective interests uncovers its own
latent hostility to issues of public, collective concern-a hostility that
perpetuated the emergence of motive and intent standards. The
Court's vision of the defendant suggests a partiality to autonomous
interests over collective goals and, correspondingly, to individual
choices over community efforts.
104. See infra notes 126-38 and accompanying text.
105. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 806 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 (1971)).
106. Id.
107. The plaintiff-employee in McDonnell Douglas was a civil rights activist who
participated in different types of demonstrations against his employer. Id. at 794. Plaintiffs in
Griggs were a power company's employees alleging that certain standardized tests effectively
excluded minorities from certain employment opportunities. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-28. The
plaintiffs in both cases asserted and represented the concerns of large minority interests.
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In Washington v. Davis,11 8 the Court struck a much stronger
blow to Griggs through a narrow reading of the equal protection
clause of the fifth amendment. The issue in Washington resembled the
one in Griggs. Plaintiffs, who were minority applicants for the Wash-
ington, D.C. police department, alleged that a standardized test used
for employment purposes excluded a disproportionally high number
of minority applicants. 9 Washington, however, was brought under
the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment and not under
Title VII. 1" Although the parties did not raise the issue, the Court
actively chose to consider the standards applicable in a constitutional
claim as compared to those governing Title VII. The Court held that
Title VII and the equal protection clause are driven by different stan-
dards, and that disproportionate impact alone is insufficient to estab-
lish liability in a constitutional action; proof of discriminatory racial
purpose is necessary. I
Washington greatly narrowed the scope of Griggs. Even though
the case did not raise a Title VII question, the Court chose to consider
the validity of the test under standards similar to those of Title VII.112
The Court held that the employment test was valid under statutory
standards because it was a good indicator of success in the police
training program."I3 Griggs, however, invalidated exclusionary test-
ing procedures if they were unrelated to job performance, regardless
of their impact on training programs.' 14 In Washington, there was no
proven link between the test and job performance; nevertheless, the
Court validated the test without relying on Title VII standards. 115
Though Washington was not a Title VII case, the Court's analysis of
the testing standards threatened the continued viability of Title VII in
monitoring testing procedures. 1 6 In its analysis, the Court ignored
important aspects of structural discrimination. Under the Court's
standard, tests can be invidiously discriminatory and still remain
beyond statutory reach. They can, for example, test the same verbal
skills in the entrance examination and in the training program, even if
108. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
109. Id. at 235-36.
110. The plaintiffs in Washington could not bring their claim under Title VII because the
statute was not applicable to federal employees at the time they filed the complaint. See id. at
238 n.10.
11. Id. at 245.
112. Id. at 249.
113. Id. at 251-52.
114. Washington, 426 U.S. at 266 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
115. Washington, 426 U.S. at 249-50.
116. See id. at 270 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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high scores on these exams bear no relation to actual job require-
ments." 7 By broadening the scope of permissible testing procedures
with a discriminatory racial impact, and by eliminating the require-
ment of correspondence between testing procedures and job perform-
ance, the Court ignored structural biases and prejudices that allow
discrimination to grow.
Washington exemplifies a focus on both motive and intent, and a
shift from Griggs's effects-oriented reasoning. The majority's vision
of discrimination as stemming from conscious, purposeful sources is
particularly significant because it has been recently transposed into
the Title VII arena through Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.
118
Washington not only limited the extra-Title VII implications of
Griggs, but it also introduced a type of reasoning that would soon
infiltrate and alter Title VII jurisprudence. In Wards Cove, the
Supreme Court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework and the
reasoning of Washington to mold the standard of intent in the context
of disparate impact Title VII cases. Although McDonnell Douglas
presumed intent as an element of the suit, and although Washington
did not propose to set the standard for non-constitutional cases, the
two set the stage for the Court's search for the defendant's motive in
Wards Cove.
Wards Cove involved a disparate impact Title VII claim by non-
white Alaskan cannery workers, alleging that their employer's hiring
and promotion practices resulted in a racial stratification that denied
them noncannery positions as skilled workers.I 9 The Court began its
analysis by noting that Title VII proscribes facially neutral employ-
ment practices regardless of intent, and that this claim fell under the
disparate impact paradigm. 120 The Court, however, then proceeded
to undermine the disparate impact jurisprudence established by
Griggs. First, the Court held that a showing of racial imbalance is
insufficient to support a claim of disparate impact, and that a plaintiff
must point to the specific employment practices that created the
imbalance. 2' Wards Cove thus makes it more difficult than ever to
attack deeply imbedded discriminatory practices, even where they are
numerous and pervasive, because they may be difficult to identify as
specific incidents.122 Moreover, a plaintiff who must point out specific
incidents may be forced to delve into the employer's cognitive process
117. Id.
118. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
119. Id. at 647-48.
120. Id. at 645-46.
121. Id. at 657.
122. See Fischl, supra note 90, at S12.
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in order to isolate the incidents in question. Evidence of racial dispar-
ity, or impact, is no longer sufficient as it was under Griggs.
Justice White's opinion in Wards Cove recognized the severity of
the specific causation requirement. To justify the added burden, the
majority noted that liberal discovery rules render employers' records
easily accessible, and that federal regulations require some employers
to maintain and disclose records regarding selection procedures and
discrimination. 12 3 The Court's reasoning reflects a flawed assumption
that all discriminatory practices are consciously undertaken in a way
that can be recorded or determined, and specific enough to be identi-
fied. The assumption is flawed because our feelings about race are
unconsciously shaped by a multitude of cultural factors. 24 If Title
VII is to be used efficiently to combat racial discrimination, it must be
directed at behavior that stems both from our cultural, structural
biases, and from our specific conscious choices. By insisting on proof
of specific instances of discrimination, the Court ignores the most
deeply imbedded patterns of structural racism. The Court's reasoning
also reflects its vision of the defendant as an individual who should be
liable for conscious, identifiable choices, rather than as a bureaucratic,
imperfect entity. The defendant becomes a reconstructed fiction that
conceals bureaucratic realities and possesses a sense of motivation
that may be unattributable to large corporate entities.
125
Wards Cove also altered the evidentiary burdens for employers
and employees in disparate impact cases. First, if a plaintiff can sat-
isfy the stiff causation requirement described above, the employer may
counter with a business justification for the alleged practices,
126
instead of the previous standard, which required a showing of busi-
ness necessity. 127 Second, the Court shifted previous burdens of proof
by holding that the burden of persuasion on the business justification
issue remains with the employee; the employer only has a burden of
123. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657-58. The majority refers to the Uniform Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1-.18 (1988). It is ironic that the regulatory
obligations and liberal discovery rules that the majority uses to justify its stringent causation
requirement do not even apply to the plaintiffs in this case since the employers did not preserve
records of this type. Id. at 673 n.20.
124. Lawrence, supra note 90, at 322.
125. Professor Whitman notes:
Our struggle with the consequences of racism and sexism has made us aware that
injuries do not flow solely from the acts of evil or careless persons.... [A] law
that addresses only the isolated behavior of individuals, whether private or
official, sees only some of the ways in which power can be abused, and the abuse
of power is a subject with which the law is properly concerned.
Whitman, supra note 22, at 276.
126. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 658-59.




Allowing the defendant employer to counter allegations of dis-
criminatory impact with a business justification rather than a business
necessity has dramatic consequences. The business justification
rationale, borrowed from McDonnell Douglas, outlined the means for
determining intent in cases alleging disparate treatment, as opposed to
disparate impact.' 29 When a plaintiff challenges an employer's
motives, it is logical to allow that employer to respond with an alter-
native, permissible motivation to justify the alleged wrongdoing. In a
disparate impact case, however, the plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case simply by showing the effects of certain employment practices.
Before Wards Cove, an employer had to respond by showing that the
practices were necessary.130 A mere business justification, however,
allows an employer to propose a multitude of otherwise permissible
reasons justifying the imbalance. By transferring McDonnell Doug-
las's business justification framework into the disparate impact arena,
the Court blurred the distinction between the two paradigms,13 1 per-
mitting an employer to counter evidence of discrimination with a
business justification instead of a business necessity. The natural con-
sequence of Griggs would have been to treat Wards Cove as part of the
disparate impact chain of cases, which dictate that employment prac-
tices with discriminatory effects can only be justified by business
necessity. 
32
Wards Cove further blurred the distinction between disparate
impact and treatment by imposing the burden of persuasion on the
business justification issue on the plaintiff. Again, the Court injected
McDonnell Douglas's disparate treatment analysis into the disparate
impact paradigm. To determine intent in a disparate treatment case,
McDonnell Douglas requires a prima facia showing of discrimination,
after which the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate
reason for the practice. 33 Because McDonnell Douglas was a dispa-
rate treatment case, the plaintiff retained the burden of showing an
128. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
129. Id. at 667-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). McDonnell Douglas held that once an employee
established minority status, applied and qualified for a certain position, was rejected, and after
the rejection, her employer continued to seek similarly qualified applicants, the burden shifts to
her employer to show a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for her rejection. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
130. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("This causal-almost
summary-rejection of the statutory construction that developed in the wake of Griggs is most
disturbing.").
131. Id. at 668-69.
132. Id. at 668.
133. McDonnnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
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improper motive, the primary allegation of the complaint.1 34 In cases
where the employee alleges discriminatory impact, however, it is illog-
ical for the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing a lack of suitable
justification for the employer's behavior. Thus the Court inappropri-
ately applied the McDonnell Douglas rationale in Wards Cove by
requiring the plaintiffs to work within the framework of burdens of
proof designed to establish motive. 135 Once the employee establishes
a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer's response is in
the nature of an affirmative defense for which the employer should
bear the burden. 136 After Wards Cove, structural problems of racism
and sexism are very difficult to attack under Title VII. Although
there is not an explicit motive requirement, this showing seems neces-
sary to win a Title VII case: Plaintiffs must point to specific practices
that caused incidents of discrimination, and plaintiffs bear the burden
of showing that the employer's proffered justifications are
illegitimate. 137
Wards Cove illustrates how drastically the Court's vision of
responsibility has changed. The contrast between Wards Cove and
Griggs in terms of an employer's legally enforceable obligations is
remarkable. Griggs made an employer a participant in a social call to
end all forms of discrimination, imputing an affirmative responsibility
to shape the racial stratification of the workplace and to rectify even
unintended imbalances. Wards Cove all but eliminated the concept of
responsibility established by Griggs. Wards Cove made an employer
responsible only for chosen actions. No longer are employers respon-
sible for the racial balance of the workplace; they are beyond reproach
as long as their choices do not cause the harm. The evidence of dis-
criminatory impact in Wards Cove was striking, eliciting comparisons
to a plantation economy: housing and dining facilities, as well as jobs,
134. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that in a disparate
treatment case, there is no statutory violation unless the employer's purpose was illegitimate;
"the employee retains the burden of proving the existence of intent at all times").
135. If intent has to be established by inference in a disparate treatment case, the
McDonnell Douglas burdens of proof are used. Id. at 670. In a disparate impact case,
however, the relevant inquiry centers on the effects of an employer's practices, not on his
motivations. Id. Therefore, when an employee presents a prima facie case of disparate impact,
an employer's only recourse is to justify the practice as a business necessity. Id. Such a
justification, however, is an affirmative defense, for which the employer bears the burden of
proof. Id.
136. Id.
137. See Fischl, supra note 90, at S13 ("The Reagan Court thus seems to conceive of
disparate-impact theory as a device for uncovering hidden discriminatory motives-not one for
eliminating the discriminatory consequences of unexamined institutional practices, as the
Court had emphasized in Griggs and its progeny.").
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were divided along racial and ethnic lines.1 38 Nevertheless, the Court
refused to impute responsibility. Instead, the Court focused on
whether the plaintiffs could point to specific instances of discrimina-
tion and a lack of justification for them.
2. BEYOND MOTIVE: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND THE
LIMITS OF ACTIONABLE DISCRIMINATION
Much of the Court's recent statutory interpretation related to
employment discrimination reflects the use of private rights norms to
interpret statutory text narrowly.' 39  Recent cases exemplify two
related trends: (1) narrow readings of statutory text with little regard
for public policy; and (2) a vision of discrimination as a series of sin-
gle, individually perpetrated intentional acts rather than as a struc-
tural, institutional problem.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union," the Supreme Court nar-
rowly interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which provides that "[a]ll persons
... shall have the same right.., to make and enforce contracts." In
Patterson, the Court held that section 1981 does not proscribe racial
discrimination in all aspects of contractual relations, and that the
scope of the statute is limited to discrimination at the time of contract
formation. 4 The Court refused to expand the scope of section 1981
to any employment practices after the formation of the contract. Fur-
thermore, it confirmed previous doctrine by requiring a showing of
intent: "[T]he question under § 1981 remains whether the employer,
at the time of the formation of the contract, in fact intentionally
refused to enter into a contract with the employee on racially neutral
terms."'
142
In Patterson, a black former employee of a credit union sued her
former employer when she was discharged after working there for ten
years. She alleged that her former employer had violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 by harassing her, failing to promote her, and discharging her
because of her race. 43 The Court held that the right to make con-
tracts does not extend to conduct, discriminatory or not, after con-
tract formation.'"
138. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 663-64 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 484.
140. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
141. Id. at 2372.
142. Id. at 2376-77. In General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375
(1982), the Court held that section 1981 claims require proof of intentional discrimination.
Patterson merely followed a well-settled doctrine in confirming an intent requirement.
143. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
144. Id. at 2372-73.
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Patterson uncovers a misconception in the Court's vision of dis-
crimination. By limiting the plaintiff's claim to circumstances sur-
rounding contract formation, the Court implies that discrimination
can always be discerned as one or more distinctive episodes, linked to
an identifiable time frame. The inference is that discriminatory con-
duct that occurs after contract formation is separate, and does not
stem from invidious discrimination that existed when the contract
was formed.
The Court's reasoning can lead to ludicrous results. Recently, in
Perry v. Command Performance,14 the Third Circuit applied the rea-
soning of Patterson in a non-employment context, holding that a
white beautician would not be liable under section 1981 for refusing
to serve a black client unless the black customer could prove that the
contract for services was formed when she arrived for the appoint-
ment, since that is when the discernible instance of discrimination
took place."4 If the contract was formed over the telephone, the
plaintiff would have no action, since discrimination would not have
occurred at the time of contract formation. 147 What the Court's rea-
soning in Patterson failed to grasp is that discrimination that occurs
during contract formation often has a resonant effect, causing injury
long after the contract is formed-injury that stems from invidious
discrimination. Perry illustrates the limited reach of section 1981
after Patterson: seemingly non-discriminatory conduct at time of
contract formation can be a veil for insidious discrimination that very
much affects the execution, if not the formation, of the contract.
Like Washington v. Davis, Patterson demonstrates the Court's
reluctance to expand protection against discrimination beyond Title
VII. The Court is cautious in its quest for equal opportunity. It
attaches liability only in those settings where conscious discrimina-
tory practices are readily apparent and easily classified under specific
statutes. The result is unfortunate because section 1981 covers many
employment scenarios that are not protected by Title VII.148 The
145. 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1990).
146. Perry v. Command Performance, 913 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1990).
147. Id. at 101. The court conceded that even if the contract was formed at the time the
appointment was made by telephone, the court could find that the contract was grounded on
discriminatory terms. Id. at 102. For example, the contract may have been conditioned on the
availability of a hairdresser who would treat black customers. Id. Such a condition would
presumably violate section 1981. Id. The court emphasized nonetheless that discrimination
would have to be linked to contract formation, irrespective of blatant discriminatory behavior
after the contract was formed. Id.
148. See Fischl, supra note 90, at S13 (noting that section 1981 can reach beyond Title VII
to encompass (1) businesses with fewer than fifteen employees, (2) awards of damages beyond
back pay, and (3) non-employment contractual relations like education).
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majority's selection of "the most pinched reading of the phrase 'same
right to make contract' "149 exemplifies the type of narrow statutory
interpretation that protects existing entitlements, limiting the scope of
the statute's potential beneficiaries. 5 °
The Court demonstrated a similar type of formalism in Lorance
v. AT&T Technologies,151 which held that the limitations period in a
lawsuit arising out of a facially neutral seniority system begins to run
when the allegedly discriminatory practices are adopted, not when
their effects are felt. 15 2  The plaintiffs in Lorance were women
employed by AT&T Technologies.1 5 3 Until 1979, the company calcu-
lated seniority on the basis of years spent in the plant." 4 A collective-
bargaining agreement signed in 1979, altered the system by determin-
ing seniority not on the basis of plantwide service, but on the basis of
time spent as a tester. 55 The plaintiffs in this lawsuit became testers
between 1978 and 1980; they were demoted in 1982 based on their
low seniority, although they would not have been selected for demo-
tion under the previous seniority system. 6 They alleged that tester
positions had traditionally been held by men, but that many women
became testers in the 1970's, and that the 1979 alteration was an
attempt to protect incumbent male testers.'
5 7
The Court classified plaintiffs' claims as alleging an intentional
discriminatory alteration of contractual rights that occurred in 1979,
when the defendant company eliminated those rights.158 According
to the Court, the plaintiffs' actions accrued at that time.'5 9 The
majority's reasoning ignored the reality that employees may not know
whether they will be adversely affected until the effects of the discrim-
inatory act are felt.
Lorance illustrates the Court's reluctance to recognize the very
nature of discrimination in employment."w By asking employees to
anticipate and speculate on future discrimination, the Court ignored
149. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. Commentators have criticized the Court's attempts to limit the scope of statutes
designed to benefit disadvantaged groups. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 483 (arguing that
courts should interpret legislative gaps in favor of disadvantaged groups).
151. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
152. Id at 911.
153. Id. at 901.
154. Id. at 901-02.
155. Id. at 902.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 903.
158. Id at 905.
159. Id. at 911.
160. The claim in Lorance alleged gender and not racial discrimination in employment. Id.
at 903. Title VII covers both types of discrimination:
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the sexism embedded in the defendant company's seniority system.
Furthermore, it reinforced the notion of discrimination as a phenome-
non characterized by single incidents among individuals. According
to the Court, discrimination occurred when the alteration to the sen-
iority policy took place, and not when the plaintiffs were demoted. As
in Patterson, the Court identified discrimination as the single event
rather than as a continuing wrong reflective of a structural bias. Pat-
terson and Lorance exhibit remarkably similar visions of discrimina-
tion as a non-structural, incident-specific phenomenon that occurs in
discrete moments, like contract formation (Patterson) and alterations
of seniority rights (Lorance). In both cases, discrimination is inten-
tional, so that the search for motive continues. In both cases, the
Court neglects the resonance of discriminatory effects.
The employment discrimination cases are factually and doctri-
nally complex. The factual complexity stems from the wide variety of
situations that can arise in the workplace. The doctrinal confusion,
however, stems at least in part from the Court's inability to under-
stand the structural characteristics of discrimination in employ-
ment. 1 61 By insisting on a showing of motive, the Court personifies
and distorts institutional defendants accused of discrimination.'62
Liberal visions of justice may be driving the Court's search for some-
one whose motive is to blame, since liberal principles refuse to impute
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
Gender and race discrimination present different sociological and economic problems.
However, for purposes of this Comment, gender and race discrimination reveal the same type
of misunderstandings on the part of the Court. In both Patterson and Lorance, the Court
viewed discrimination as a series of distinct incidents, contract formation or alteration of sen-
iority rights, rather than as an institutional problem. See Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2372-73;
Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911.
161. Congress responded swiftly to the Court's 1989 employment discrimination decisions.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-856, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
was designed to overrule many of these decisions. On October 24, 1990, the Senate was one
vote short of the two-thirds necessary to override a Presidential veto of the Civil Rights Act.
See Barrett, Bush Veto of Job-Bias Bill is Sustained; Action is Called a 'Temporary Setback,'
Wall St. J., Oct. 25, 1990, at A22, col. 1.
162. For a discussion of the law's misunderstanding of organizational behavior and
malfunctioning, see M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16.
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responsibility for structural, communal problems. A collective notion
of responsibility would resemble the Court's holding in Griggs. 63 Just
as in the police brutality cases, however, there must be some limit to
such an alternative vision of responsibility. It is equally unsatisfying
to blame employers for every racist attitude in the workplace, includ-
ing those which they may have done nothing to promote.
Liberalism's incident-specific vision of discrimination may sug-
gest a method for arriving at a new definition of responsibility.
Because the Court sees institutions as nothing more than the sum of
their individual parts, it also sees discrimination as nothing more that
the sum of individual instances of wrongdoing, characterized by dis-
cernible events like contract formation (Patterson), alterations of sen-
iority rights (Lorance), or specific incidents that can explain a
discriminatory impact (Wards Cove). Perceptions of motivated, inci-
dent-specific discrimination are consistent with liberalism's autonomy
driven basis. They suggest why the Court's vision is at best blurred
and at worst blind to issues of structure and public concern, which
may have little to do with either motive or with individual instances
of discrimination. In order to shape a more complete concept of
responsibility, it is necessary to first reconstruct judicial perceptions of
institutions. If courts can shift from a personified and individualized
vision of institutions to one that incorporates their opaqueness,164 and
the structural characteristics of institutional behavior, they may
arrive at a more accurate definition of institutional problems like dis-
crimination in the workplace and corruption in the police department.
A more complete picture of institutional malfunctioning may lead to a
more complete vision of responsibility, one that holds us accountable
for more than our evil motives. If, for example, the Court can see
discrimination as more than a series of specific, intentional acts, and if
it can incorporate history, structure, inertia, and indifference into its
definition of discrimination, then it may begin to require more from
individuals than simply good intentions. Through this understanding,
a new definition of responsibility emerges, one that begins by looking
not at the individual, but at the institution-at the community-and
163. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that Title VII prohibits the
use of employment practices that are discriminatory in effect). Griggs typifies a broader,
collective notion of responsibility, since it imputes an obligation on the employer to create a
workplace community free of discriminatory consequences of employment practices. Id. at
432. The Court was less concerned about the employer's motivation than it was about the
institutional make-up of the workplace.
164. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16, at 38 ("Because of their complexity and formality,
organizations are both opaque and impermeable: their acts and decisions are not the
straightforward product or expression of any particular individual will ....").
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by inferring from the realities of institutional behavior the compo-
nents of individual and collective accountability.
C. Insider Trading
Insider trading case law reveals how the Court uses motive to
define duties to the market in a manner consistent with liberalism's
narrow vision of responsibility. This Section focuses on cases brought
under Rule lOb-5165 which was promulgated under section 10(b) of
the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.' 66 The contours for civil
and criminal liability under Rule lOb-5 have been the source of a
complex body of case law since the Rule was enacted in 1942. The
past fifteen years exhibit a trend that is somewhat analogous to the
patterns explored in the police brutality and employment discrimina-
tion contexts. Since 1975, a series of Supreme Court decisions has
limited the scope of relief to lOb-5 plaintiffs by strictly interpreting
the elements of the Rule. 67 The defendant, in most of these cases, is
ordinarily not a corporate or municipal institution. Nevertheless,
Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence contains many familiar themes, including
an explicit imposition of a standard of intent, and a vision of the mar-
ket as an aggregate of individual participants, whose responsibility to
one another is defined by a narrow range of duties. 68
165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1989). Rule lOb-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
166. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-ll (1988).
167. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that liability under Rule 10b-5 is based
on the breach of specific fiduciary duties); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(holding that liability under Rule 10b-5 must be based on a showing of the defendant's
scienter-an intent to defraud); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)
(holding that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to bring a Rule 10b-5
action).
168. Most of the jurisprudence generated by Rule lOb-5 presumes that insider trading has
detrimental effects on the market and on investors. Courts emphasize an unfairness to
shareholders and harm to the corporation due to a loss of confidence and consequential loss of
value. Other cases emphasize that insider trading may hinder market efficiency. See Blue Chip
Stamps, 421 U.S. at 765-67 ("Manipulators who have in the past had a comparatively free
hand to befuddle and fool the public... are to be curbed....") (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 2,271
(1934)); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The core of
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1. SCIENTER AND OTHER LIMITATIONS
In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 169 the Court held that a plaintiff
must show scienter, defined as an "intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud," ' 70 in order to prevail on a Rule lOb-5 action. The Court
emphasized the statutory language of section 10(b), which prohibits
the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." 171
Noting that the word "manipulative" connotes willful conduct, the
Court justified its decision by narrowly interpreting the statute, in an
opinion void of any policy analysis.
172
In Ernst & Ernst, plaintiffs were customers of First Securities
Company, a small brokerage firm that retained the defendant, Ernst
& Ernst, as an accounting firm.' 73 The president of First Securities
initiated an allegedly fraudulent security scheme, in which the plain-
tiffs invested. 174 When the fraud became evident, the plaintiffs sued
Ernst & Ernst under a theory of negligent nonfeasance, alleging that
they aided and abetted First Securities in violating the securities
laws.'7  While rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the Court ignored any
policy implications of its analysis. For example, the Court might have
analyzed the need to promote the use of professional financial experts
in the market. Instead, the opinion was based exclusively on a for-
malistic statutory construction argument.
176
Ernst & Ernst is instructive for several reasons. Most impor-
tantly, it establishes the standard of intent more explicitly in the
insider trading arena than in any other. Secondly, the opinion's strict
construction of the statute reflects a disregard for public policy and
for the effects of the decision. Much like the Court's decision in Pat-
terson v. McLean Credit Union, 177 Ernst & Ernst illustrates an empha-
sis on narrow statutory interpretations that disregard the broad
Rule lOb-5 is the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors should have
equal access to the rewards of participation in securities transactions."), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969). There are commentators who maintain, however, that insider trading has positive
consequences. See generally H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
(1966).
169. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
170. Id. at 193.
171. Id. at 195 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970)).
172. See id. at 197; see also R. CLARKE, CORPORATE LAW 327 (1986) ("In a sense, the
opinion's narrowness is odd, because a reasonable argument could have been made that a
scienter requirement was a good filter for straining out vexatious litigation.").
173. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 188-89.
174. Id
175. Id. at 190.
176. See R. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 327.
177. 491 U.S. 164 (1989). See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
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remedial purposes of the relevant statute. 7 The dissents in both
cases condemned the Court's blindness to the consequences of such
narrow visions. In Patterson, Justice Brennan decried the Court's
confinement of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to "the narrowest possible scope"
which is "antithetical to Congress' vision of a society in which con-
tractual opportunities are equal.' 7 9 Similarly, the dissent in Ernst &
Ernst complained that the majority confined Rule lOb-5 and frus-
trated the victim's recovery through a narrow and restrictive reading
of the statute:
The Court's opinion, to be sure, has a certain technical consistency
about it. It seems to me, however, that an investor can be victim-
ized just as much by negligent conduct as by positive deception,
and that it is not logical to drive a wedge between the two, saying
that Congress clearly intended the one but certainly not the
other.'80
Ernst & Ernst illustrates the Court's preference for literalism
over policy analysis. The Court emphasized the language of section
10(b), arguing that Congress meant to combat only intentional mis-
conduct by use of words like "manipulative," "deceptive," "device"
and "contrivance."'' The Court recognized that the legislative his-
tory of the 1934 Act is "bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent"; 8 2 nevertheless, the Court rested its decision on the language
of the statute and a reconstructed version of congressional intent,
refusing to speak to the broad policy objectives of the Act. '8 3 Given
the legislative silence, and the gaps in the text of the statute, the
Court's decision to narrow, rather than broaden, the scope of section
10(b) indicates particular value judgments."8 4 The Court's choice
reveals: (1) a liberal emphasis on individual ends and intentions over
structural problems created by misinformation, (2) a limited vision of
responsibility to the institution of the market, and (3) a conservative
political swing favoring existing power structures in the market who
regularly benefit from inside information. 85
178. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asking whether "investor
victims, such as these, are ever to have relief under the federal securities laws that I thought
had been enacted for their broad, needed, and deserving benefit") (emphasis added).
179. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2379 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
180. Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 216 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 197.
182. Id. at 201.
183. Id. at 206 ("There is no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for
such practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The catchall provision of § 10(b)
should be interpreted no more broadly.").
184. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 32, at 422 ("When the language of a statute does not
specify its implementing rules, textualism is incomplete: courts must look elsewhere.").
185. See generally Sunstein, supra note 33, at 918-19 (analyzing the Court's tendency to
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The contours of insider trading liability have been defined by
other restrictions on plaintiffs attempting to vindicate the anti-fraud
provisions of the 1934 Act. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 186 the Court held that only purchasers and sellers of securities
in an allegedly fraudulent transaction or scheme have standing to seek
judicial protection under Rule lOb-5.' 87  On one level, Blue Chip
Stamps illustrates the Court's disregard for public-rights concerns.' 88
The Court used standing to ensure that only actual, private partici-
pants in the market got relief, ignoring the general market effects of
insider trading and the statutory objective of parity of information.
The Court's holding is illogical as a matter of public policy because
plaintiffs who buy or sell stock based on false statements are not nec-
essarily injured more seriously than those who are similarly tricked
into not buying by the same information.18 9 Together with Ernst &
Ernst's scienter requirement, the standing limitation ensures that only
plaintiffs who suffer an identifiable, private rights type of injury get
relief from defendants who actually intended to cause injury. Again,
the Court favors that which separates us-our individual choice and
our individual injury-from that which connects us-a need to pro-
mote parity of information and fairness in the market. Additionally,
Blue Chip Stamps suggests that the Court views the institution of the
justify the preservation of market entitlements under the guise of neutrality). Although
Professor Sunstein does not analyze Rule lOb-5 jurisprudence, he argues that courts tend to
view neutrality as a constitutional requirement, and that courts define neutrality as the
protection of existing social and economic entitlements. Id.
186. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
187. Id. at 754-55. The Court's dramatic limitation of the potential class of plaintiffs was
surprising in light of the unique fact scenario of Blue Chip Stamps. The defendant was a stamp
company that, pursuant to a consent decree, offered a favorable price for its own stock to the
victims of its prior anticompetitive practices. Id. at 725-26. Two years later, one of the victims
who had not bought the stock brought suit under lOb-5, alleging that the company had given a
pessimistic prospectus of the stock in order to discourage trading at the artificially low price set
by the consent decree. Id. at 726-27. The facts were sufficiently atypical to warrant a narrow
holding. However, the Court instead used Blue Chip Stamps to make a radical statement
about the legitimacy of many plaintiffs' claims. See R. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 319-20
("[T]he Blue Chip plaintiffs had a plausible claim only because of a fairly peculiar fact
situation.... Blue Chip is as significant for its effort to adopt a flat, objective, tough rule as it
is for a holding about the purchaser-seller limitation."); Brooks, Rule JO-b5 in the Balance: An
Analysis of the Supreme Court's Policy Perspective, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 419 (1980) (stating
that Blue Chip Stamps revealed the Supreme Court's attitude towards Rule lob-5 private
damage actions: "[U]nless a plaintiff can support the maintenance of an action on policy
grounds favored by the Court-the absence of vexatious litigation, overall fairness to the
defendant, and the promotion of efficient judicial administration-the merits of the action will
not be adjudicated").
188. See Brooks, supra note 187, at 423 (suggesting that commentators had foreseen an
ascendancy of public advocacy, which was rejected by the Court in Rule lob-5 litigation).
189. R. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 320.
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market as an aggregate of individuals,"9° recognizing only those who
actually buy and sell. The market, however, is a more complicated
organization, affecting and injuring all sorts of individuals, those who
buy and sell, as well as those who rely on information to refrain from
buying and selling. The Court's limited individualist vision prevents
it from penetrating the opaqueness' 9' of the market.
2. SPECIFIC FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE DISLOCATION
OF THE DEFENDANT
The Supreme Court has further emphasized the private rights
aspects of insider trading actions by requiring proof of the breach of
specific duties to specific individuals, thus rejecting liability based on
the breach of duty to the market as a whole. 192 These cases are signifi-
cant not because they define the standard of intent, since that was
explicitly imposed by Ernst & Ernst, but because, by emphasizing the
individualism and autonomy of the defendant, they define the individ-
ual's obligations to the institution of the market narrowly.
The Court's search for specific duties was not predicated on
widespread lower court case law. In fact, the Second Circuit explic-
itly endorsed a broader responsibility to the trading community in
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 193 which held that anyone possessing
material inside information must either disclose it or abstain from
trading.' 94 The court emphasized that Rule lOb-5 "is based in policy
on the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all
investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal
access to material information."' 195
Thus, because Texas Gulf Sulphur recognizes a duty to the mar-
ket as a whole, a defendant can be held liable upon a mere finding of
trading on material, nonpublic information, regardless of the defend-
ant's status as an insider or outsider. Texas Gulf Sulphur's equal
access approach is consistent with a public-rights model of communi-
190. See M. DAN-COHEN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (analyzing a view of organizations as
aggregates of persons, and suggesting that such a view leads to a perception of all institutions
as individuals, denying the complexity of many of our organizations).
191. See id. at 38 (describing organizations as "opaque").
192. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 660 (1983) (holding that the tippee's
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on inside information arises
only when the insider breached a fiduciary duty in disclosing the inside information to the
tippee); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (holding that liability for
nondisclosure "is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction").
193. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).




tarian duties as opposed to individual, private-rights obligations. As
such, Texas Gulf Sulphur is antithetical to subsequent Supreme Court
reasoning. Compare the similar perspectives of Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. 196 and Texas Gulf Sulphur. In both, courts emphasized the broad
brush of congressional intent, the need to remove certain social ineq-
uities, and a communal prerogative of equality of access and opportu-
nity.1 97 Like Griggs, Texas Gulf Sulphur focuses on an attempt to
restructure and achieve a social objective-in this case, parity of
information. Both decisions are teleological; they explicitly embrace
and promote certain values. Both are daring in their conception of
responsibility, suggesting that any participant in an institution is
accountable for the fairness of its operation. Today's Supreme Court,
in contrast, is much more concerned with breaches of individual obli-
gations than with a collective vision.' 98
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the equal access the-
ory and the notion of a broader fiduciary duty. In Chiarella v. United
States, 99 the Court held that liability for nondisclosure of material
nonpublic market information "is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence,"'  and that
absent an insider or fiduciary relationship with sellers of stock, the
purchaser had no duty to disclose nonpublic market information.2°'
In Chiarella the defendant was an employee of a large printing com-
pany, who identified the targets of potential corporate takeovers from
documents he handled as a "markup man. '20 2 Without disclosing his
knowledge, Chiarella purchased stock in the target companies and
sold for a profit after a takeover began.
20 3
Emphasizing that Chiarella had no duty to the sellers of the tar-
get companies' stock, the Court explicitly rejected the notion of a
broader duty to the market.' Chiarella is significant primarily
196. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
197. In Griggs, the Court emphasized that Title VII was designed to "achieve equality of
employment opportunities and remove barriers." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30. Similarly the
Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur argued that Rule lOb-5 is designed to promote another
type of equality, parity of information: "[A]ll investors should have equal access to the
rewards of participation in securities transactions." Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d. at 851-52.
198. See Phillips, An Essay: Six Competing Currents of Rule lob-5 Jurisprudence, 21 IND.
L. REV. 625, 629-631 (1988) (describing Texas Gulf Sulphur as a decision driven by an idealist
vision and noting that changes in the Court's personnel have curtailed the trend toward the
ideal of equal information among market participants).
199. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
200. Id. at 230.
201. Id. at 232-33.
202. Id. at 224.
203. Id.
204. Justice Powell stated:
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because of its explicit rejection of Texas Gulf Sulphur's equal access
theory. The Court drew the defendant's actions not in terms of a
broad remedial statutory purpose like parity of information, but
rather through a narrow framework of specific duties, viewing the
defendant as an employee of X with a duty to Y, rather than as a
market participant inextricably tied to millions of other participants.
This approach is extremely private rights-based: Rather than focus-
ing on a common social objective, the Court disposed of the case on
an individual obligation rationale.20 5 Moreover, the Court rejected
any kind of responsibility beyond an intentional breach of a fiduciary
duty.
Dirks v. SEC2 reinforced Chiarella's emphasis on specific
duties owed by autonomous and disinterested market participants. In
Dirks, the Supreme Court held that
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corpora-
tion not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the
insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by dis-
closing the information to the tippee and the tippee knows or
should know that there has been a breach.2"7
Dirks, an officer of a brokerage firm, had received information from a
former officer of an insurance company, alleging that the assets of the
The Court of Appeals said that its 'regular access to market information' test
would create a workable rule embracing 'those who occupy... strategic places in
the market mechanism.' These considerations are insufficient to support a duty
to disclose. A duty arises from a relationship between the parties ... and not
merely from one's ability to acquire information because of his position in the
market.
Id. at 231 n.14 (citations omitted).
205. Two concurring and two dissenting opinions were filed in Chiarella. Only Justice
Blackmun's dissent (in which Justice Marshall joined) adopted the notion of a general
fiduciary duty to the market in order to promulgate the parity of information objective implicit
in Rule lOb-5. "I would hold that persons having access to confidential material information
that is not legally available to others generally are prohibited by Rule lob-5 from engaging in
schemes to exploit their structural informational advantage through trading in affected
securities." Id. at 251. Chief Justice Burger reconciled the tension between limited duties and
statutory objectives with a misappropriation theory:
As a general rule, neither party to an arm's-length business transaction has an
obligation to disclose information to the other unless the parties stand in some
confidential or fiduciary relation. . . . [T]he rule should give way when an
informational advantage is obtained, not by superior experience, foresight, or
industry, but by some unlawful means.
Id. at 239-40. See Note, Outsider Trading-Morality and the Law of Securities Fraud, 77 GEO.
L.J. 181, 193 (1988) ("The misappropriation theory bridges a gap left by Chiarella, extending
liability to outsiders who use nonpublic information in violation of a duty owed to someone
other than the shareholders of the corporation whose shares are traded.").
206. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
207. Id. at 660.
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insurance company were vastly overstated as a result of fraudulent
practices.2 °8 Dirks discussed the information with a number of clients
and investors, many of whom sold their holdings in the insurance
company." ° Dirks was therefore both a tippee and a tipper. The
Supreme Court expanded the notion of specific duties, enunciated in
Chiarella, to find derivative liability for tippees. The Court explained
that a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain from trading
only if the insider breached a fiduciary duty in tipping.210 That fiduci-
ary duty, in turn, is determined by the purpose of the tip. If the
insider benefits personally from a disclosure, the insider breaches a
fiduciary duty; but absent some personal gain on the part of the
insider, there is not a derivative breach.2 '
Dirks adds an additional dimension to the jurisprudence of
motive and intent in insider trading cases. There is an added element
of motivation in determining whether the insider initially breached a
fiduciary duty, since the court must determine whether or not he
gained a personal benefit.212  "The device employed in this case
engrafts a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doc-
trine. This innovation excuses a knowing and intentional violation of
an insider's duty to shareholders if the insider does not act from a
motive of personal gain." '213 Scrutiny into the insider's purpose in giv-
ing information to the tippee is a secondary intent requirement that
further divorces the defendant's duty from the remedial purposes of
Rule 1Ob-5. Combined with Ernst & Ernst's scienter requirement, the
Court's search for motive in the insider's initial tip in Dirks creates
dual hoops of premeditation through which the plaintiff is forced to
jump.
208. Id. at 649.
209. Id.
210. Id at 662.
211. Id. at 662-64.
212. Id. at 663. The Court distinguished the scienter requirement in Ernst & Ernst from the
"objective criteria" used to define the insider's fiduciary duty through a personal benefit test
that is independent of intent:
[T]he initial inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the insider.
This requires courts to focus on objective criteria, L e., whether the insider
receives a direct or indirect personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a
pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings.
Id. However, to determine whether the insider breached the initial fiduciary duty, the Court
had to explore his "deceptive or fraudulent conduct." Id. at 663 n.23. The words "deceptive
or fraudulent conduct" carry similar connotations to the words "manipulative or deceptive
device," which the Court in Ernst & Ernst found to imply intent. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). Dirks thus implicates a secondary intent requirement for derivative
tippee liability.
213. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Dirks is also instructive because it reflects a complete departure
from the public-rights orientation of the Second Circuit in Texas Gulf
Sulphur.2"4 The reasoning of Texas Gulf Sulphur would have invoked
a broader fiduciary duty to promote parity of information and to pre-
vent shareholder injuries. Instead, the Supreme Court took a step fur-
ther away from the public element of insider trading by focusing on
motivational elements rather than the resulting injury and deterrence
of future malfeasance and nonfeasance. Like Chiarella, Dirks limits
the duties owed by market participants to one another, consistent
with liberalism's tendency to maintain a distance between individuals,
protecting their separateness and forsaking the ends of the institution
of the market.
3. ATTEMPTS AT EFFECTS-ORIENTED REASONING
The Court implicitly endorsed a more effects-oriented approach
through its tacit approval of the misappropriation theory used by the
Second Circuit in United States v. Carpenter.21 5 Carpenter, a news
clerk for the Wall Street Journal, served as a messenger for a conspir-
acy between an employee of the newspaper, who tipped information
that was to appear in the financial column, and stockbrokers who
traded securities accordingly.2 16 The newspaper's policy deemed con-
fidential the news that was to be printed in the column.21 The Sec-
ond Circuit convicted Carpenter under the theory that Rule lOb-5
proscribes an employee's misappropriation of material nonpublic
information from his employer.21 8
The Second Circuit endorsed a broad, remedial role for the mis-
appropriation theory, inconsistent with the Supreme Court's previous
disregard for public policy prerogatives: "[T]he misappropriation
theory more broadly proscribes the conversion by 'insiders' or others
of material non-public information in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities. ' 219 The court explicitly rejected the specificity of
duties enunciated in Chiarella and Dirks:
214. The dissent suggests a more effects-oriented approach: "The fact that the insider
himself does not benefit from the breach does not eradicate the shareholder's injury.... The
duty is addressed not to the insider's motives, but to his actions and their consequences on the
shareholder." Id. at 673-74.
215. 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The Supreme Court implicitly
endorsed the misappropriation theory by confirming Carpenter's conviction on Rule lOb-5
grounds. "The Court is evenly divided with respect to the convictions under the securities
laws and for that reason affirms the judgment below on those counts." 484 U.S. at 24.
216. Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1026.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 1029.
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Clearly, Congress has understood its predecessors to have deline-
ated illegal conduct along the lines not simply of relationships to
corporations and duties arising thereunder, as developed by the
line of cases through Cady, Roberts and Dirks. Rather, Congress
apparently has sought to proscribe as well trading on material,
nonpublic information obtained not through skill but through a
variety of 'deceptive' practices, unlawful acts which we termed
'misappropriation.
220
The misappropriation theory, though more remedial and pro-
spective than the narrow approaches of Dirks and Chiarella, neverthe-
less includes a motivational component. The defendant's actions still
must be deceptive in terms of intent. In an attempt to exclude the
efforts of market analysts and other professionals from the reach of
misappropriation liability, the court introduced an element of motiva-
tion into its analysis. Defendants who intentionally steal information
are liable, while professional financial experts who merely find infor-
mation are not. The motive behind the gathering of information is
dispositive. 221  Though the misappropriation theory suggests a
broader remedial outlook, it is not based as much on parity of infor-
mation as it is on gaining information by fraud and breach of confi-
dentiality. After Carpenter, the search for intent and specific duties
continues, largely because the Ernst & Ernst intent requirement and
the Dirks' fiduciary duty analysis subordinate the misappropriation
theory.222 In Carpenter, the court determined liability by looking not
at the consequences of the fraud, but rather at the defendant's means
of getting the information, to decide whether his intent was to
defraud.
In Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 23 the Supreme Court recently exhib-
ited an effects-oriented approach to the question of disclosure under
Rule lOb-5. The Court held that preliminary merger negotiations are
material and warrant disclosure when "there is a substantial likeli-
220. Id. at 1030-31.
221. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 242-43 (1979) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(Under the misappropriation theory, "market specialists would not be subject to a disclose-or-
refrain requirement in the performance of their everyday market functions.... [T]rading is
accomplished on the basis of material, nonpublic information, but the information has not
been unlawfully converted for personal gain.").
222. One commentator notes:
Chiarella and Dirks required the Second Circuit to base its legal holding on the
breach of a fiduciary duty and precluded the court from finding a fiduciary duty
to the market. Thus, the court's inability to recognize a duty to the market
arising out of efficiency concerns has necessitated an awkward and conceptually
inconsistent cross-pollination of injuries and duties in order to establish liability.
Note, supra note 205, at 208-09 (citations omitted).
223. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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hood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in
deciding how to vote. ' 224 For our purposes, however, Basic is more
relevant for its second holding.225 Instead of requiring each plaintiff
to show reliance on the defendant's misrepresentations, the Court
endorsed a presumption of reliance on the integrity of the market:
"Because most publicly available information is reflected in market
price, an investor's reliance on any public material misrepresenta-
tions, therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule lOb-5
action. ' 226 First, the Court recognized that reliance is an element of
any Rule lOb-5 claim, because it provides the causal connection
between the defendant's misrepresentation and the plaintiff's
injury.227 The Court then emphasized that buyers rely on the integ-
rity of the price set by the market, but that integrity is lost by public,
material misrepresentations.228
The Court's endorsement of a presumption of reliance supported
by the fraud-on-the-market theory is significant because it recognizes
structural consequences of fraud in the context of a duty to the integ-
rity of the market. As such, Basic embraces a more effects-oriented
type of reasoning to serve the underlying purposes of Rule lOb-5.
This distinguishes Basic from the narrower approach of Dirks and
Chiarella, which rejected any reasoning directed at the structural con-
sequences of the defendants' actions. Basic, however, is still shaped
by a notion of the defendant as an autonomous individual whose
intent is of paramount importance. Plaintiffs still must show scienter
linked to specific fiduciary duties, in accordance with Ernst & Ernst,
Dirks, and Chiarella.
The jurisprudence of Rule lOb-5 exemplifies the Court's empha-
sis on the private. Liability attaches when it can be linked to illicit
motives (Ernst & Ernst) and when individuals violate individual
duties (Chiarella, Dirks). The class of potential plaintiffs narrows in
an attempt to protect existing market structures as if they were natu-
224. Id. at 231 (quoting TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
225. Id. at 247.
226. Id. The defendant, Basic Inc., had agreed to merge with Combustion Engineering,
Inc. Id. at 227-28. During the two-year course of negotiations, Basic made three public
statements denying the existence of any merger negotiations. Id. at 228. Former stockholders,
who had sold their stock during the period between the first denial of pre-merger negotiations
and the suspension of trading just prior to the merger, brought suit under Rule lOb-5. Id. The
Supreme Court was thus faced with two questions: (1) whether the pre-merger negotiations
were material, warranting disclosure, and (2) whether a stockholder who traded after the
issuance of the materially misleading information may invoke a presumption of reliance on the
integrity of the market. Id. at 226. For purposes of this discussion, the second issue is most
notable because it indicates a vision of duty to the market.
227. Id. at 243.
228. Id. at 247.
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ral and inviolate (Blue Chip Stamps).229 Furthermore, by rejecting
broader duties to the market, the Court remains faithful to its liberal,
narrow vision of responsibility. It regards the institution of the mar-
ket as an aggregate of disinterested individuals with limited obliga-
tions to one another. Basic may have opened the door to a structural,
effects-oriented vision of the market for information. Nevertheless,
liability under Rule lOb-5 is still defined through liberalism's lens,
through a motive-centered, narrow vision of responsibility.
III. AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, AND THE COURT'S
THEORY OF JUSTICE
This Comment has analyzed the manifestation of motive and
intent in three doctrinal areas. It has examined the link between
motive and the Court's disregard for issues of structure, and has pos-
tulated that the Court's protection of the private sphere and of
existing entitlements stems from a liberal conception of justice. This
section probes the philosophical underpinnings of the Court's vision,
exposing some of its conceptual shortcomings as sources of intent
jurisprudence. An examination of the tensions within the Court's the-
oretical spectrum provides the perspective for an analysis of case law
manifestations.
A. Political Theory and Jurisprudence: The Court's
Theoretical Framework
1. RAWLS AND MODERN LIBERALISM
There is a tension in modem political theory between a liberal
emphasis on individual rights and a teleological focus on the role of
community and cooperation.23 ° In 1971, John Rawls promulgated
229. For criticism of this type of judicial reasoning, see Sunstein, supra note 33, at 874-75
(arguing that the Court's philosophy mistakenly uses the status quo as the baseline for
measuring departures from neutrality).
230. See Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV 479, 479 (1989) ("It is widely
thought that liberalism as a political theory is hostile to, or anyway not sufficiently
appreciative of, the value or importance of community, and that liberal tolerance, which insists
that it is wrong of government to use its coercive power to enforce ethical homogeneity,
undermines community."); Gutmann, supra note 13, at 308 ("We are witnessing a revival of
communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the 1960s, those of the
1980s fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic."); Sandel, Morality
and the Liberal Ideal, NEw REPUBLIC, May 7, 1984, at 217, 218 ("[I]n philosophy as in life,
the new faith becomes the old orthodoxy before long.... [T]he rights-based ethic has recently
faced a growing challenge from a different direction, from a view that gives fuller expression to
the claims of citizenship and community than the liberal version allows.").
Civic Republicans also criticize liberalism, but they emphasize political dialogue and
participation more than communitarian goals. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1697 (arguing that
republicanism emphasizes "that human beings are essentially political animals, that they can
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the contemporary notion of the primacy of the "right" over the
"good" in a book that revolutionized modern liberalism. 231 Rawls
emphasized a Kantian vision of the importance of individual rights
and autonomy, of humanity free from government interference.232 He
argued that each individual is entitled to his or her own conception of
the good.233 Accordingly, government should be neutral with respect
to competing conceptions of the good in order to allow for autonomy:
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even
the welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason
justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by the
greater good for others.... [I]n a just society the liberties of equal
citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not
subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social
interests.234
Rawls's liberalism exhibits a distinguishable, if reluctant, justifi-
cation for the imposition of certain subjective values and for certain
intrusive government activities. Although Rawls's theory is based on
government neutrality and individual liberty, he argues that a neutral
framework must be defined by some normative considerations:
We collect such settled convictions as the belief in religious tolera-
tion and the rejection of slavery and try to organize the basic ideas
and principles implicit in these convictions into a coherent concep-
tion of justice. We can regard these convictions as provisional
fixed points which any conception of justice must account for if it
is to be reasonable for us.
235
Rawls is also distinguished by his justification of social and eco-
fulfill their natures only by participating in self-government, and that the most important aims
of the political community should be to promote virtue among the citizenry and to advance the
common good." In contrast, most versions of liberalism "insist that individual human beings
are ultimate subjects of moral value.").
231. J. RAWLS, supra note 6; see Gutmann, The Central Role of Rawls's Theory, DISSENT,
Summer 1989, at 330, 338-39 ("Among twentieth-century philosophical works Rawls's theory
may be our most common possession.").
232. See J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 251-57.
233. Id. at 92-93 ("The main idea is that a person's good is determined by what is for him
the most rational long-term plan of life given reasonably favorable circumstances.").
234. Id. at 3-4.
235. Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 228
(1985). Rawls also notes that
U]ustice as fairness holds that, with regard to the constitutional essentials, and
given the existence of a reasonably well-ordered constitutional regime, the family
of very great political values expressed by its principles and ideals normally will
have sufficient weight to override all other values that may come into conflict
with them.
Rawls, supra note 44, at 242-43.
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nomic reform within the liberal paradigm.236 Rawls's theory is based
on several conceptional tools. The first he calls "the original posi-
tion,' '237 which is a hypothetical condition where all beings are
deprived of 'all knowledge of the contingencies of their lives, such as
race, sex, and economic status. From within this veil of ignorance,
one can choose a set of governing principles that is inherently fair
because the principles are derived independently of subjective social
contexts. "The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of igno-
rane.... Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design
principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice
are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. '231 In the original posi-
tion, according to Rawls, a principle of distribution would be cho-
sen. 239 This "difference principle" 24 would emphasize the notion that
"the higher expectations of those better situated are just if and only if
they work as part of a scheme which improves the expectations of the
least advantaged members of society. ' ' 241 The difference principle has
characterized Rawls as the author of "a liberalism for the least
advantaged, a liberalism that pays a moral tribute to the socialist cri-
tique. ' 242 Thus, in spite of his emphasis on autonomy and procedure,
Rawls justifies mechanisms for progressive economic distributions.
Rawls's theory is not so individualist that it denies the role of
community and cooperation. Community, however, is subordinate
to, and derivative of, the individual.24 Rawls's emphasis on an origi-
nal position characterized by mutual disinterest 2" does not preclude
the choice of community as an individual's end. However, his vision
of justice never compromises the primacy and autonomy of the indi-
vidual, and community becomes one value among many that individ-
uals can choose. 245 "The question then becomes whether individuals
236. Ryan, Communitarianism: The Good, the Bad, & the Muddly, DISSENT, Summer
1989, at 350, 350 ("Academic political theory has for two decades operated under the shadow
of John Rawls's wonderful book, A Theory of Justice; that book provides a sustained and often
moving defense of welfare-state liberalism.").
237. See J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 17.
238. Id. at 12.
239. Id. at 14-15.
240. Id. at 75.
241. Id.
242. Gutmann, supra note 231, at 339.
243. M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 64 ("On Rawls' view, a sense of community describes a
possible aim of antecedently individuated selves, not an ingredient or constituent of their
identity as such. This guarantees its subordinate status.").
244. J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 13 ("One feature of justice as fairness is to think of the
parties in the initial situation as rational and mutually disinterested.").
245. M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 64 ("[C[ommunity must find its virtue as one contender
among others within the framework defined by justice, not as a rival account of the framework
itself.").
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who happen to espouse communitarian aims can pursue them within
a well-ordered society, antecedently defined by the principles of jus-
tice, not whether a well-ordered society is itself a community (in the
constitutive sense)."
246
Although Rawls's liberalism emphasizes the primacy of individ-
ual rights and autonomy, it also recognizes the need for some basic
normative values, the importance of fair distribution of economic
resources, and the potential for community.247 Therefore, it may
allow for a greater sense of interdependence than does the Court's
philosophy, which is driven by a vision of the exclusivity of individu-
alism. While Rawls allows for the potential for community, the
Court's emphasis on the private excludes community from judicial
concern. The Court's emphasis on autonomy and individualism may
not be all that consistent with the liberal paradigm. The Court belies
Rawlsian notions of neutrality by protecting existing entitlements,
which may not be derived from intrinsically fair procedures like those
of Rawls's original position. The argument is that Rawlsian neutral-
ity is, in fact, illusory, and that the Court, by nature a politically
charged entity, has advanced a conservative agenda. 248 The primacy
of the right over the good is transposed to the Court's focus on intent
over public policy. Instead of achieving neutrality, the Court has
become an instrument of a conservative agenda and an obstacle to
social restructuring.
2. THE CRITICS OF LIBERALISM
Although liberalism appeals to conceptions of liberty, equality,
and control over our own lives, its critics decry its glorification of
autonomy and its blindness to the community ties that constitute and
shape us.249 Critics argue that an individual can never make choices
like those called for by the original position, because, removed from
our ties to those around us, we are completely dislocated. 250 "To
imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these
is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a
person wholly without character, without moral depth. ' 251 Commu-
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 4, at 244.
248. See West, Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at 641 (arguing that conservative
constitutionalism has replaced libertarian principles in the current Supreme Court).
249. See, e.g., Kelman, A Critique of Conservative Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
436, 438 (D. Kairys rev. ed. 1990) ("[Libertarians] do indeed posit that we can imagine some
set of authentic individual desires antedating and independent of the existence of
community.").
250. M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 178.
251. Id. at 179.
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nitarianism attacks the basic assumptions of liberalism; most impor-
tantly, it rejects the notion that individual rights are prior to collective
ends. Instead, communitarians argue that we are defined by our com-
munal ties, and that together we share common goals. Communitari-
anism suggests a return to a teleological vision of society that
encourages civic virtue through friendship and a cooperative search
for the common good. Its appeal for a resurgence of community val-
ues is nostalgic: "When politics goes well, we can know a good in
common that we cannot know alone. '252
The communitarian critique is itself vulnerable to criticism, pri-
marily because it does not provide a viable, tangible alternative to the
liberalism it scrutinizes.2"3 Commentators have argued that commu-
nitarianism proposes "fraternity rather than justice as the fundamen-
tal social value. ' 254  As such, communitarianism is susceptible to
parochialism. Community can result in the positive fusion of different
conceptions of the good; just as easily, however, it can succumb to
petty prejudices and unjust manifestations of the collective will.
Moreover, the concept of fraternity seems somewhat utopian.2 55
Communitarianism, however, has served as a springboard for
other critics of liberalism who base their analysis in legal theory. The
tension between liberalism and communitarianism, for example, has
been roughly transposed to legal theory in the relationship between
liberal legalists and critical legal theorists.25 6 In addition, the recent
advent of civic republicanism stems largely from the communitarian
252. Id. at 183.
253. But cf Hirshman, The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L.
REv. 983 (1990) (noting that while critics of liberalism have argued for the importance and
primacy of community, they have failed to articulate a theory of the common good that
explains the ends to which the community should aspire, and suggesting an end, or telos, to
which the community should aspire in the virtue of liberality).
254. Ryan, supra note 236, at 350.
255. See Reich, A Question of Geography, NEw REPUBLIC, May 9, 1988, at 23; Liberalism
and Community, NEW REPUBLIC, May 9, 1988, at 22, 23.
In real life, most of us don't live in communities at all in the traditional sense
(kids running over lawns, corner soda fountains, town meetings, PTAs)... the
liberal task is not to add legitimacy to the spurious notion of geographic
community. It is to seek new ways of defining and fostering community that
transcend borders of race, ethnicity, and class.
Id.
256. See West, supra note 35, at 5.
Liberal legalists, in short, describe an inner life enlivened by freedom and
autonomy from the separate other, and threatened by the danger of annihilation
by him. Critical legal theorists, by contrast, tell a story of inner lives dominated
by feelings of alienation and isolation from the separate other, and enlivened by
the possibility of association and community with him.
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critique of the isolated individual in liberalism.257 Civic republicans
propose a dialogue-based society, where political community is pro-
moted through citizen participation in the making of the law.
258
Frank Michelman, for example, criticizes a liberalism-based jurispru-
dence that excludes groups of people and encourages a passive,
detached judiciary whose decisions seem predetermined.259 Civic
republicans focus on the transformative nature of law, and on the
need for individuals to participate in political action and
lawmaking.2 6°
The civic republican and communitarian arguments are similar,
particularly in comparison to liberalism. 26' Therefore, they are vul-
nerable to similar attacks. Some argue that civic republicanism
succumbs to anthropomorphism; it supposes that communal life is
the life of an outside person, that it has the same shape, encounters
the same moral and ethical watersheds and dilemmas, and is sub-
ject to the same standards of success and failure, as the several lives
of the citizens who make it up.
262
Communitarianism's notion of a constitutive community is suscepti-
ble to a similar attack. Like civic republicanism, it integrates commu-
nal with individual experiences, claiming that "community must be
constitutive of the shared self-understandings of the participants and
embodied in their institutional arrangements, not simply an attribute
of certain of the participants' plans of life.
2 63
Other critics of republicanism note the arguments previously
examined in the context of communitarianism. Though civic republi-
canism de-emphasizes a notion of the common good and focuses
instead on positive freedom,2 6 it shares with communitarianism a
257. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 1696.
258. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1495 ("[R]econsideration of republicanism's deeper
constitutional implications can remind us of how the renovation of political communities, by
inclusion of those who have been excluded, enhances everyone's political freedom.").
259. Id. at 1496-97.
260. Id. at 1505 ("Republican thought... demands some way of understanding how laws
and rights can be both the free creations of citizens and, at the same time, the normative givens
that constitute and underwrite a political process capable of creating constitutive law.").
261. The line distinguishing civic republicanism from communitarianism is a difficult one to
draw. Communitarianism is an "animating source" of republicanism. Fallon, supra note 13,
at 1696. Civic republicanism draws from other sources as well, most notably a historical
challenge to the primacy of natural rights theorists like John Locke. Id. There are similarities
between civic republicanism and liberalism as well. See, e.g., West, supra note 88, at 60-61
("Modern civic republicanism rests on a synthesis of aspects of the classical republicanism
partly embraced but largely rejected by the drafters of the Constitution with some of the
pluralistic values and traditions of modern liberalism.").
262. Dworkin, supra note 230, at 492.
263. M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 173.
264. Fallon, supra note 13, at 1725.
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utopian view of a society that can achieve this sort of political trans-
formative dialogue. At some level, both theories may overlook the
complexity of today's society. One commentator notes that "[t]oday
we live in a radically diverse society, rife with subcultures.... Mean-
ingful participation in national politics is no longer open to most of
US."
2 6 5
3. BALANCING THE THEORETICAL TENSION
The canvass of political theory extends from extreme individual-
ism to an equally extreme emphasis on community. Perhaps we
reflect and possess the tenets of each theory within the spectrum, so
that both liberalism and communitarianism have a place in the reflec-
tion of political theory through jurisprudence. A choice between lib-
eralism and communitarianism is unnecessary, and indeed impossible,
if we all possess characteristics of each:
The Rule of Law itself values and protects our autonomy and mini-
mizes the dangers that are consequent to our vulnerability. That's
its official role. But it also has an unofficial, underground, subter-
ranean potentiality, only occasionally recognized, but nevertheless
always there. The Rule of Law is a product of our dread of aliena-
tion from the other and our longing for connection with him.
2 66
If we simultaneously and paradoxically long for both autonomy
and community, then each theory serves a purpose in jurispru-
dence.267 As the next section shows, the flaw in the Court's philoso-
phy is that in its emphasis on autonomy, it completely disregards
communitarian notions-emphasizing the private at the expense of
the public. The conceptual leap from individualism to intent is a
short one:
From the standpoint of individualism I am what I myself choose to
be. I can always, if I wish to, put in question what are taken to be
the merely contingent social features of my existence. I may bio-
logically be my father's son; but I cannot be held responsible for
what he did unless I choose implicitly or explicitly to assume such
responsibility.
268
The prominence of motive as a source of liability may stem
265. Id. at 1734.
266. West, supra note 35, at 52 (juxtaposing the legal theories of liberalism and critical legal
studies with those of cultural and radical feminists in a study of the inadequacies of male-
dominated jurisprudence to women's values).
267. See C. BERRY, THE IDEA OF A DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 15 (1989) ("[The]
democratic community that constitutes an alternative to the excessive individualism of liberal
capitalism will preserve and transcend some elements of the liberal order.").
268. A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 220 (1981) (emphasis
added).
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largely from liberalism's failure to articulate a tangible definition of
responsibility. Communitarianism and civic republicanism, on the
other hand, are grounded on a much richer definition of responsibil-
ity. Both theories suggest that an individual is constituted and shaped
by a surrounding community, that individual motive and communi-
tarian motive must at some level converge. This suggests an unduly
burdensome definition of responsibility, one that would impute liabil-
ity on the community as a whole whenever any member of the com-
munity acts improperly. It would make every individual somewhat
responsible for the effects of our society's past and present racism,
corruption, and indifference. The challenge is to define a communi-
tarian theory of responsibility that rests somewhere between the total-
itarianism of a world where we are at all times responsible to and for
one another; and the world we find ourselves in today, where mutual
detachment and separation render us incapable of owing or expecting
anything from our neighbors.
B. The Court's Philosophical Vision as Reflected in Case Law
1. THE PERSONIFICATION OF THE DEFENDANT: AN EMPHASIS ON
LIBERALISM AND INTENT
The Court's liberal vision reconstructs, personifies, and privatizes
defendants by emphasizing individualist characteristics such as
motive,269 and dislocating the defendant from structural and contex-
tual realities of racism, sexism, and corruption. The police brutality
and employment discrimination cases exemplify the Court's tendency
to personify corporate and municipal defendants. In the section 1983
context, this personification of institutional entities began with the
Supreme Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Serv-
ices,270 which held that a municipality is a person for purposes of sec-
tion 1983.27 Monell's progeny reinforced the notion of a city as a
person with decisionmaking power and with the capacity to feel delib-
erate indifference.2 72 Similarly, the employment discrimination cases
illustrated a vision of the corporate defendant as a person. In Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,273 the Court insisted that a Title VII
plaintiff must point to specific instances of discrimination as opposed
to general discriminatory impact. 274 In justifying that employers'
269. Motive may be an illogical notion in cases of corporate and municipal defendants. See
supra Section II.
270. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
271. Id. at 690. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
272. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).
273. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
274. Id. at 657. See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
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records are often an accessible documentary source of specific inci-
dents,273 the Court envisioned a large corporate entity as an individual
capable of making conscious, discernible choices. The personification
of institutional defendants facilitated the imposition of the standard of
intent, because people can have motivation, while inanimate entities
cannot.276
The personification of the defendant is a conceptual flaw that
stems from the Court's adoption of liberalism's emphasis on the indi-
vidual and on autonomy. The individuals' right to choose her own
ends is central to liberalism.277 Thus, the Court searches for a defend-
ant's motives, even where the defendant is not a human being. The
emphasis on motivation is consistent with liberalism, which holds that
individuals are not inherently tied to those around them; that individ-
uals are not constituted by a community. This narrow vision of inter-
dependence drives a correspondingly narrow vision of responsibility;
liberalism frowns on holding a defendant liable for anything that is
not attributable to chosen ends. The defects that stem from commu-
nity ties are independent of the individuals who do not choose those
ends. Thus, liberalism personifies institutions because of the central-
ity of individualism, and emphasizes intent because of the notion of
the individual as sovereign of one's own ends.
Liberal thought shapes a warped view of institutional behavior
by personifying institutional defendants. The Court misunderstands
the dynamic of institutional behavior because its liberal vision focuses
on individual people, with their individual rights, ends, choices, and
motives. When the Court considers institutions, it often perceives
them as aggregates of previously individuated beings. Similarly, dis-
crimination becomes no more than the sum of individual instances of
intentional conduct. That is why Patterson recognizes only discrimi-
nation at the time of contract formation;278 Lorance recognizes only
discrimination at the time seniority rights were altered;279 and Wards
Cove insists on proof of specific instances of discrimination. 8 Other
doctrinal areas show the same perspective. Abusive behavior by
police officers becomes nothing more than the sum of individual
275. 490 U.S. at 657-58.
276. See Whitman, supra note 22, at 248 ("To require the plaintiff to establish the
defendant's 'state of mind'-a particular intent, or attitude, or purpose-is to assume, quite
literally, that the defendant will have a mind to evaluate.").
277. See J. RAwLS, supra note 6.
278. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
instances of consciously chosen policies intended to cause injury.28'
The misuse of the flow of public information becomes nothing more
than the sum of individual instances of intentional breaches of fiduci-
ary duties to identifiable victims participating in the market.28 2 Indi-
vidualism aggravates judicial near-sightedness. The Court recognizes
individual, intentional instances of wrongdoing, but it can neither see
nor regulate the connections among us-the ties that go beyond the
sum of our individual parts, ties that bind together and tear apart. An
emphasis on motive and intent reflects this blindness, since intent pre-
serves the individuated, personified character that the Court attributes
to institutional defendants. Furthermore, intent disregards the char-
acteristics of our connections, those unconscious and intangible fac-
tors that give a group character by making it something more than
the sum of its parts. In this way the centrality of motive both personi-
fies the institutional defendant, by imputing cognitive powers, and
reconstructs the defendant as a mere aggregate. Consequently, liber-
alism infers a very limited view of responsibility that corresponds to
its limited view of interdependence. Since institutions are mere aggre-
gates, its members are only responsible for their individual intentional
acts. Liberalism does not allow for a version of responsibility that
incorporates the ties that bind us together.
As a consequence of liberalism, our emphasis on intent perme-
ates our jurisprudence. In City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,28 3 the
Court searched for "conscious choice" on the part of municipal
policymakers whose police training policies lead to an unnecessary
death.2" 4 The insistence on conscious choice is consistent with liberal
philosophy. The Court could not find the "person" of the police
department liable for the structural imperfections it had not chosen.
Distorted through the lens of a personified municipal entity, the
Court's liberal philosophy could not find the person of the police
department liable for imbedded racism and corruption-structural
problems reflective of the community's faults.
In Washington v. Davis, 28 5 the Court held that proof of discrimi-
natory racial purpose is necessary to establish a claim under the equal
281. See, e.g., City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985). See supra notes 60-68
and accompanying text.
282. For specific examples, see supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text (discussing Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)); supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text
(discussing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)); supra, notes 199-
205 and accompanying text (discussing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)); and
supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text (discussing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)).
283. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
284. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
285. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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protection clause against an institutional employer.28 6 Here again, the
Court personified an institutional defendant and analyzed its state of
mind, perceiving the defendant employer as a person with the capac-
ity to discriminate intentionally. The Court recognized only inten-
tional racism because of liberalism's emphasis on the primacy of the
individual, and of individual choice. At the same time, the Court
ignored evidence of structural problems. By rejecting the need to
show a link between test results and job performance, the Court
ignored an essential institutional manifestation of racism.287
Liberalism's focus on separateness de-emphasizes the bonds that
connect us. Some of these bonds are the structural manifestations of
racism and corruption attacked in Washington and Tuttle. Because
liberalism does not address these aspects of interdependence, it cannot
grasp the significance of many structural problems. In both Washing-
ton and Tuttle, the plaintiffs attempted to attack racism and corrup-
tion not easily attributed to an intentional act. In Tuttle the plaintiff
questioned the policy of a police department; in Washington the plain-
tiffs questioned the impact of a standardized test. Although both poli-
cies can have discernible discriminatory effects, it is difficult to show
how either could stem from discernible discriminatory motives. 28 8 In
an increasingly complex and integrated world, however, the racist
manifestations of training policies and standardized tests affect us and
connect us. It is in liberalism's failure to recognize these connections
that we locate the origins of intent and motive standards. Liberalism
cannot provide redress for irresponsibility unrelated to individual
motive. Therefore, when the problem belongs to the collective, to the
police department, corporation, or market, liberalism does not impute
liability.
In the insider trading cases, the Court's view of the market as an
aggregate embodies the characteristics of the personified police brutal-
ity and employment discrimination defendants-autonomy and
intent. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,28 9 the Court made the stan-
dard of intent explicit by holding that a plaintiff alleging a violation of
Rule lOb-5 must show scienter. 29° Ernst & Ernst reflects the same
286. Id. at 245. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: The Viewfrm 1989, in THE POLITICS OF
LAW 121, 143 (D. Kairys rev. ed. 1990) (stating that standardized tests measure little more
than testing ability; more often than not they fail to correlate in any way with job
performance).
288. See Lawrence, supra note 90, at 322 (arguing that because much racism stems from
our unconscious, the Court's emphasis on intent ignores the very nature of the problem).
289. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
290. Id. at 193. See supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text.
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type of individualism that protects the defendant's rights to motive at
the expense of public policy. Much like Tuttle rejected a police
department's duty to eliminate structural corruption and Washington
rejected a duty to eliminate structural racial discrimination, Ernst &
Ernst rejected a duty to eliminate disparity of information in the
structure of the market. Furthermore, the Court's vision of the insti-
tution of the market is also artificial. The market is somehow recon-
structed in a way that recognizes only certain tangible injuries, like
those caused by intentional actors breaching specific fiduciary duties.
This limiting vision ignores important structural characteristics of the
market. It ignores the potential for cooperation among market par-
ticipants, and, correspondingly, it ignores the existence of structural
defects that result because we neither promote nor recognize coopera-
tion.291 As a result, negligence, nonfeasance, and corruption go unad-
dressed because they may be unintended, but they injure nonetheless.
In police brutality, employment discrimination, and insider trad-
ing cases, corporate, municipal, and market institutions are in a sense
reconstructed and personified. They become either individuals capa-
ble of motive, or aggregates whose connections are empty and unim-
portant. The central theme is that the individual is accountable only
for choices and motives. This is consistent with a Rawlsian percep-
tion of an unincumbered individual, a free agent responsible only for
chosen ends.292 This vision, however, is inconsistent with a communi-
tarian or civic republican ethic which would equate a defendant's
interests with those of the community293 and impose a standard of
responsibility when those interests are violated, either by an individ-
ual's intent, or by the community's unintentional failure.
2. SPECIFICITY OF DUTY CONSISTENT WITH THE LIBERAL VIEW
Liberalism's glorification of the individual is also evident in cases
that define duties owed by defendants to plaintiffs and to others. In
291. Autonomy and disinterest were not always dominant values in the corporate world.
See, e.g., Simon, Contract Versus Politics in Corporation Doctrine, in THE POLITICS OF LAW
387, 394-402 (D. Kairys rev. ed. 1990). Simon argues that in the nineteenth century, corporate
actors were concerned with economic democracy, with the effects of their actions on society as
a whole, and with notions of citizenship and cooperation. They viewed the market as more
than a series of contractual exchanges; it was also a mechanism to encourage meaningful
participation and to reinforce community ties.
292. See J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 3 ("Each person possesses an inviolability founded on
justice.').
293. See M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 173 (1982) (suggesting that a community constitutes




Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,294 the plaintiff was forced to iden-
tify specific instances of discrimination as opposed to showing a gen-
eral discriminatory impact. The Court implied that a defendant
employer has a duty to refrain from initiating specific instances of
discrimination. However, an employer is not under an affirmative
duty to free the work place from discrimination. There is no general
duty to guard against structural racism and sexism; there is only a
duty to refrain from individual incidents of wrongdoing.
Similarly, in Dirks v. SEC 295 and in Chiarella v. United States,
296
the Court narrowly interpreted the duties owed by a defendant
accused of insider trading. Chiarella held that Rule lOb-5 liability
attaches only when the defendant has a fiduciary relationship with the
purchasers or sellers of stock.297 Dirks held that a tippee's fiduciary
duty derives from the insider's, or tipper's, breach of fiduciary duty.298
Like Wards Cove, these two cases recognize only a duty from one
individual to another; there is no duty to the workplace community or
to the community of the market.299
In a society defined by liberalism's emphasis on pluralism and
separateness, liability only attaches when another's space is intention-
ally violated. Because there is no additional responsibility to one
another under the liberal view, structural imperfections and broader
community duties are of secondary importance at best. The Court's
language in both Chiarella and Wards Cove emphasizes separateness,
disinterest, and a lack of recognition for others. In Chiarella, the
Court balked at holding a defendant liable when he was nothing but
"a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers only through imper-
sonal market transactions. '"" Why should Chiarella, who had no
relationship with the shareholders of the corporations whose shares
he traded, care about them, much less be responsible to them? Simi-
larly, in Wards Cove, the Court refused to find an employer liable for
conduct with a racially discriminatory impact, unless the employee
could point to specific practices responsible for racial disparity.30 1
After all, the employer has no duty to remedy the "myriad of inno-
cent causes" which the employer neither initiated nor meant to per-
294. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See supra notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
295. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
296. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
297. Id. at 230. See notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
298. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660. See notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
299. Structural and political concerns encouraged broader duties to the community of the
market in the nineteenth century. Simon, supra note 291, at 395. Our individualist tendencies
were not always dominant.
300. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33.
301. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
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petuate.3 ° 2 Both opinions operate on the same assumptions of mutual
disinterest: to the Court, we are fundamentally strangers to one
another. Again, liberalism misunderstands the importance of cooper-
ative behavior in institutions, ignoring the possibility that mutual
interest might be a natural and worthwhile value to nurture, and
rejecting the potential for broader duties to our respective communi-
ties--duties that would complement and reinforce our ties to one
another.
The Court's narrow interpretation of duty in different doctrinal
areas reflects its individualist philosophy. Liberalism emphasizes the
separateness of individuals, and the fear of annihilation from
others.30 3 Therefore, liberal philosophy is reluctant to impose duties
on others, since that would intrude on the separateness that is liber-
alism's very essence. Duty is defined narrowly, from individual to
individual, not from individual to community. As the insider trader
in Dirks is free from a duty to the market, so the employer in Wards
Cove is free from a duty to keep the work place free of discriminatory
practices. Their duties are defined strictly by their relationship to the
plaintiffs and by the specific incidents in question, not by any notion
of the common social good.
The duty cases exemplify the Court's emphasis on separateness,
consistent with liberalism's emphasis on mutual disinterest.3a  The
Court relies on assumptions of mutual disinterest and alienation to
impose duties only in those circumstances where an individual inten-
tionally violates another's space. Neither liberal theory, nor the
Court's jurisprudence, however, adequately explains the exclusivity of
mutual disinterest as an underlying assumption. If community were
an underlying, competitive value, then the Court could logically infer
duties arising from mutual interest, duties that would take into
account that which connects us, imposing responsibility for the struc-
tural imperfections that reflect collective weaknesses.
3. STRICT CONSTRUCTIONISM AND LIBERALISM'S
EMPHASIS ON RIGHTS
The liberal ideal protects a framework of fundamental rights,
respected within a society where each individual can pursue his or her
own ends a.30  Rawls' procedural mechanism establishes an ostensibly
302. Id. (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 992 (1988)).
303. See West, supra note 35, at 5.




neutral framework of choice for those fundamental rights. 3 6 The
Court's extrapolation of justice from the liberal ideal, however, has
resulted in a distorted emphasis on strict constructionism, rights, and
neutrality. The distortion stems in part from inconsistencies in the
Court's definition of rights. In trying to conform with a notion of
government ostensibly neutral with respect to competing conceptions
of the good, the Court inevitably exhibits a bias towards some rights
over others, thus violating the ideal of neutrality.3 °7 This Section ana-
lyzes the Court's emphasis on strict constructionism and rights
reflecting an exaggerated emphasis on neutrality. Motive and intent
remain relevant throughout, often as the consequences of narrow con-
structions of statutes and legal concepts such as standing and statutes
of limitations.
In Patterson v. McClean Credit Union,3°8 the Court narrowed the
scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, holding that the statute did not reach
employment practices after the formation of the contract. 30 9 Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, on the other hand, narrowly interpreted the word
"manipulative" in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to mean that only
intentional conduct is actionable under Rule lOb-5.31 ° In both opin-
ions, the majority attempted to remain neutral by emphasizing statu-
tory language rather than the social wrong Congress was trying to
correct. As a neutral interpreter, rather than an active participant in
the creation of laws, the Court is like a detached and almost disinter-
ested arbiter.31 In both opinions, the Court arrived at its conclusion
by asking how liberal, abstract, individuated parties are likely to
manipulate one another. Thus, the Court developed an incident-spe-
cific, motive-based definition of responsibility, imputing liability only
as a result of an identifiable, intentional act, although Congress may
have had a more communitarian vision in mind when it enacted the
statues involved. Moreover, the Court never really remains neutral:
Strict constructionism merely reinforces normative notions, protect-
306. See M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 120 ("The priority of procedure in Rawls's account of
justification recalls the parallel priorities of the right over the good, and of the self over its
ends.").
307. Professor Sunstein argues that since Lochner, the Court has defined neutrality to mean
a deference to a market ordering and existing distributions that may not be defensible. See
Sunstein, supra note 33, at 875, 903. As a result, neutrality is both an illusory goal, and a tool
to promote value-laden principles. Id. at 904.
308. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
309. Id. at 2369. See supra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
310. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). See supra notes 169-85 and accompanying text.
311. See Michelman, supra note 6, at 1497 (criticizing the Court's detached vision as
resulting in the Court's being the "servant, not the author, of a prospective text").
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ing existing entitlements and individualist values.312 In Patterson, for
example, the Court endorsed the right of the defendant to ignore
structural racism in the work place. Similarly, in Ernst & Ernst, the
Court endorsed a normative value-the right of the defendant to be
negligent in terms of disclosure and material omissions. Patterson and
Ernst & Ernst exemplify the Court's attempt and failure to use literal-
ism to achieve neutrality. Instead of neutrality, the Court's liberalism
results in stifling resistance to change.
The Court's methodology uses strict constructionism to achieve a
rights-oriented search for neutrality through its narrow interpreta-
tions of other legal concepts. In its treatment of the statute of limita-
tions, for example, the Court protects the right of the defendant to be
held accountable only for intentional breaches of duty. In Lorance v.
A T& T Technology,31 3 the Court held that the statute of limitations for
actions arising out of a facially neutral seniority system begins to run
when the discriminatory practices are adopted, not when their effects
are felt.314 The Lorance Court used the statute of limitations to rein-
force the notion that general structural evidence of discrimination is
insufficient. Lorance illustrates the reality that statutory construction
is inherently normative. Faced with a technical statutory question,
the Court had to make a value-laden choice between the interests of
plaintiffs, who would have to sue anticipatorily if the statute were nar-
rowly drawn, and the interests of employees, who relied on the senior-
ity system.3"5 By forcing potential plaintiffs to anticipate future
contingencies, the Court relieved employers of responsibility for pre-
viously instituted intentional discrimination. Again a liberal view of
discrimination as acontextual, single incidents of wrongdoing-here,
the intentional alteration of contractual rights-prevails over struc-
tural concerns.
Similarly, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugs Stores3 6 reinforced
the liberal ideal of autonomy and neutrality through a narrow inter-
pretation of the doctrine of standing. In Blue Chip Stamps, the Court
held that only purchasers and sellers of securities have standing to
bring a Rule lOb-5 claim.3 7 The Court's rationale was based on a
desire to sift out unnecessary litigation.3"' By closing the courtroom
312. See Sunstein, supra note 32 (arguing that all statutory interpretation draws on
normative background principles).
313. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
314. Id. at 911. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
315. 490 U.S. at 912.
316. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
317. Id. at 754-55. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
318. 421 U.S. at 739.
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to many potential plaintiffs through a distinction that does not neces-
sarily distinguish meritorious from meritless claims,319 the Court
reveals the primacy of the liberal model: the values of autonomy and
mutual disinterest prevail over the prevention of fraud under Rule
lOb-5. the standing limitation addresses a concern of liberalism by
ensuring that only those individuals who have been tangibly injured
can sue. Individuals who have been injured but cannot show that
they participated in the market do not have legitimate claims. This
arbitrary distinction illustrates standing's, and liberalism's, emphasis
on separateness and autonomy.32 ° Furthermore, Blue Chip Stamps
highlights the Court's understanding of the market as a collection of
aggregates, so that only identifiable members of the group, those who
actually buy and sell, can expect redress from the law.
Narrow constructions of statutes and legal doctrines invoke an
air of neutrality and reinforce the primacy of rights. The Court sug-
gests that it serves neutrality by refusing to extend the protection and
impact of legal doctrines. Because the rules were adopted indepen-
dently of the action, they seem neutral, and facilitate the Court's
detachment from policy considerations. Strict constructionism thus
reinforces the notion that a right to neutrality is superior to subjective
ends. In the cases above, however, strict constructionism promoted
several subjective values-employees are not entitled to expect equal-
ity of opportunity in contract formation and seniority systems (Ernst
& Ernst, Lorance), and only discernible market participants can be
injured by insider trades commited with scienter (Patterson, Blue Chip
Stamps).
4. THE PLAINTIFF WHO WINS: CONSISTENCY WITH
THE LIBERAL VIEW
Plaintiffs are more likely to prevail in cases that illustrate a
breach of duty to an individual in a discernible, intentional act. In
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,32' for example, the Court held that a
decision by a municipal policymaker on a single occasion may give
rise to liability under section 1983.322 The Court could conceptually
link liability to an individual's choice, an order given by a prosecutor.
Therefore, liability could attach, holding the defendant accountable
for chosen ends, and not for negligent, structural imperfections.
Similarly, a defendant employer in Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
319. See R. CLARKE, supra note 172, at 320.
320. See Winter, supra note 25, 1387.
321. 475 U.S. 469 (1986).
322. Id. at 480. See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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kins323 faced a very high burden of proof after a plaintiff successfully
proved intentional discrimination in employment. Once a female
partnership candidate of an accounting firm successfully established
intentional discrimination, the Court held that the defendant
employer had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have made the same decision had it not taken the plaintiff's
gender into account. 324 This "substantial evidentiary burden on
defending employers" 325 may seem inconsistent with the Court's
other employment discrimination decisions of the 1988 Term; how-
ever, it may just be that the Court is more comfortable with the
notion of intentional discrimination than it is with problems of struc-
ture.326 Plaintiffs' victories in Pembaur and Price Waterhouse suggest
that the Court's liberal vision is offended by intentional discrimina-
tion, which is perceived as a deliberate intrusion into another individ-
ual's inviolate space.
The Court's tacit endorsement of the misappropriation theory in
Carpenter v. United States327 is also consistent with liberalism. Mis-
appropriation connotes an individual's conscious intrusion into
another's property, something that the Court interprets as inherently
offensive to its liberal vision. In Carpenter the defendant employee of
the newspaper owed absolutely no duty to the purchasers and sellers
of stock.32 I Nevertheless, the Court affirmed a finding of liability.329
Perhaps the Court could justify ignoring the framework of duty estab-
lished by Chiarella and Dirks because the employee in Carpenter vio-
lated liberal notions of autonomy and individual property. Liability
in Carpenter attached, not because the Court embraced a notion of
interdependence and need for collective restructuring of market eth-
ics, but because the defendant intruded on his employer's property.
An investment banker could have properly found and used the same
information that Carpenter misappropriated. 330 The former would be
conducting research; the latter, stealing. The Court is not concerned
with effects; it focuses on the motive behind the acquisition of infor-
mation. Offenses to and by individuals are easier for the Court to
understand than violations to and by collective interests, groups, and
institutions.
323. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
324. Id. at 244-45.
325. Fischl, supra note 90, at S13.
326. Id.
327. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
328. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1986).
329. Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24.
330. See Carpenter, 791 F.2d at 1031 ("Obviously, one may gain a competitive advantage in
the marketplace through conduct constituting skill, foresight, industry and the like.").
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The theoretical string of liberalism that winds through these dif-
ferent doctrinal areas emphasizes separateness over community ties,
and focuses on individual choice and motive rather than collective
goals. The liberal impulse was not always dominant. The Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 331 and the Second Circuit in SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 332 both adopted a more effects-oriented type
of reasoning, a sensitivity to the intended beneficiaries of legislative
enactments, and a recognition of the judiciary's naturally public role.
Most recent cases, however, show a marked departure from that type
of reasoning. A liberal impulse is creating distorting waves in our
case law, removing the law from its communitarian, public call.
IV. CONCLUSION: RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMUNITY THROUGH A SHIFr
AWAY FROM INTENT
This Comment has examined the standard of intent as a conse-
quence of the Court's liberal vision, suggesting that basic philosophi-
cal misconceptions have perpetuated an excessively individualist
jurisprudence. The simultaneous and paradoxic existence of both the
private and the public in all that we do parallels our simultaneous and
paradoxic yearning for both autonomy and community. The Court's
jurisprudence is impoverished because it speaks to only a part of our
experience-to our private side, to our yearning for autonomy. The
Court's emphasis on the private over the public is consistent with its
emphasis on separateness over connectedness, on the individual over
the community, and ultimately, on individual choice over collective
ends. The standard of intent is both a consequence of our veneration
of individualism, and a force that perpetuates a liberal ideology.
The prominence of motive, however, suggests that our notions of
responsibility are incomplete. This Comment has discussed doctrinal
areas where the standard of intent is judicially imposed, and where
the Court interprets statutory gaps to limit responsibility. A judicial
tendency to personify an institutional defendant with a sense of
motive underscores a judicial discomfort with problems of structure,
with issues of communal responsibility that have little or nothing to
do with a human being's motive. If the Court's vision of responsibil-
ity is unnecessarily narrow because of its emphasis on motive, the
challenge remains to find a definition of responsibility that would not
become global.
This Comment suggests a shift in focus rather than a tangible
331. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
332. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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solution. The alternative may be a different conceptual starting point.
Instead of initiating its philosophical stance with the individual, the
Court might begin with the institution or community. This is not to
say that individual rights should be ignored; only that in its initial
inquiry, the Court might consider the composition of the organiza-
tions at play in order to arrive at a more accurate picture of the
problems at issue-be they police brutality, municipal corruption, dis-
crimination, or market failure. A better understanding of the struc-
tural problems at play could lead to more logical judicial solutions.
Instead of institutional intent, the Court could propose a definition of
internal institutional responsibility, basing its imputation of liability
against a backdrop of fundamental individual rights. For example, in
its examination of racial or sexual discrimination in the workplace,
the Court might begin with an analysis of the nature of institutions,
the historical forces involved, and the communal ties at stake. At that
point, it might define responsibility not as a duty owed by an
employer to an employee arising out of a specific incident, but rather
as a duty owed by an employer to the community of the workplace, a
duty much like that imposed in Griggs.
Basing judicial inquiries on principles of communitarianism and
interdependence is tempting. However, an exclusively communitar-
ian approach would be as impoverished and as dangerous as the
Court's current vision, because collective responsibility threatens to
become global and totalitarian. a3 Individualism is our protection
against the potential excesses of the community. By ignoring the pri-
vate altogether, the Court would also ignore important experiential
dimensions of our lives. The answer lies in the recognition that we are
at once constituted and driven by individualist and communitarian
tendencies. We must find a jurisprudence that satisfies competing
333. A central criticism of the communitarian model is that it fails to suggest a method for
developing a theory of the common good without succumbing to authoritarian tendencies.
Without a basis in individual rights, how can we ever check a community's majoritarian
impulse? Some commentators have attempted to develop theories of the common good,
arguing that communitarian scholarship is incomplete without articulated notions of the
common good, and dismissing the threat of communitarian authoritarianism in a cursory
manner. See generally Hirshman, supra note 253 (arguing that communitarian scholarship
necessitates the development of a theory of the common good, and suggesting the virtue of
liberality as an appropriate end towards which the community should aspire). Hirshman
suggests that liberality, in both its ancient Aristotelian roots and its modern manifestations,
calls for a sense of moderation and redistribution of property as a solution to the problem of
poverty. Id. at 988-1011. Hirshman, however, gives but a cursory glance to the libertarian
challenge: "If and when philosophy reveals a reliable view of the good, the debate over
communal avenues to that life may begin .... (E]ven in America, autonomy has not always
been trump." Id. at 996.
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needs for both community and autonomy.334
A definition of responsibility that adequately balances the needs
of the individual and the community would be difficult to determine;
this Comment merely points to the need for a more complete vision.
The notion of finding or creating a complete jurisprudence, however,
suggests the inevitability of normative judicial intervention. As long
as the Court is detached, and as long as its decisions are predeter-
mined by a previous individualist vision, it will continue to ignore
important collective experiential dimensions of our existence, protect-
ing the status quo under the guise of neutrality.335 Recognizing that
courts make value-laden, political decisions, however, does not
answer the more difficult question: How are judges to strike a balance
between individualism and community, and how are they to direct the
norms? This is particularly difficult where the tension between the
two fluctuates as a function of different fact scenarios and the issues
that they raise. Yet, if courts must determine when to allow individ-
ual rights to prevail, then courts can never be neutral; they enter the
political fray by making subjective choices. Most disturbing in the
Court's more recent choices is that they exhibit indifference, lack of
compassion, and a conservative tendency to preserve the status
quo. 336
Politically, then, how are we to determine when the politics of
the whole should give way to the politics of the individual? This
Comment poses variations of the same question throughout: When
does the good supersede the right? When are motive and intent more
important that effects? Cases like Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio337 seem to suggest an intractable conflict. A communitarian
approach would seek to ameliorate the blatant discriminatory impact
of the workplace, while a rights-oriented view protects an employer's
right to be held liable only for his intended acts. Yet, the Court's
blindness in Wards Cove may suggest the potential for a more com-
plete vision. The resolution is not that a communitarian approach
alone should prevail, but rather that courts must look at both collec-
334. See, e.g., West, supra note 35, at 66. Professor West argues:
We need to show that community, nurturance, responsibility, and the ethic of
care are values at least as worthy of protection as autonomy, self-reliance, and
individualism. We must do that, in part, by showing how those values have
affected and enriched our lives. Similarly, we need to show.., how the refusal of
the legal system to protect those values has weakened this community, as it has
impoverished our lives.
Id.
335. See Sunstein, supra note 33.
336. Id. at 874-75; West, Constitutionalism, supra note 43, at 642-43.
337. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See notes 118-38 and accompanying text.
1991)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
tive and individual interests. Courts must recognize that institutions
are more than aggregates, that corruption and discrimination are
more than individually perpetrated incidents, and that mutuality is as
worthy a value as autonomy. A shift in judicial focus could lead to an
understanding that, by redefining responsibility and recognizing inter-
dependence, we are better equipped to protect the individualism and
the fundamental individual rights that drive our jurisprudence. With
that recognition, courts may arrive at a more comprehensive vision of
responsibility and an enriched version of freedom. In other words,
intentional discrimination in employment, intentional corruption in
police behavior, and intentional fraud in the market are all more
severe than unintentional behavior. Deliberateness must be weighed
along with communitarian priorities of social reconstruction. The
limits of this Comment lie in an inability to structure the exact com-
ponents of the balancing scale. Motive counts, yet the Court must
also consider effects, and weigh the scales of justice accordingly.
ROSA ECKSTEIN
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